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PART I: INTRODUCING THE QUESTION
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), in accord with the endeavors of his medieval predecessors
and contemporaries, was heavily dependent upon the Fathers of the Church for his theological
inquiries. The greatest of the Scholastic doctors understood himself as a conduit of the wisdom he
himself received from earlier doctors of the Church. This medieval method of theology—originating in
part with such persons as St. John of Damascus in the East and Peter Lombard in the West—amounted
to a synthetic engagement of the patristic theologians with the goal of producing a unified and holistic
theological account of the faith. Aquinas speaks of “the authority of the doctors of the Church as one
that may properly be used” in sacred doctrine.1 The insights of the Fathers are integral and
indispensable for theological teaching. Aquinas acknowledges, however, that the Fathers are not
automatically correct in what they affirm, but that they are merely “probable.” On many occasions one
finds discrepancies and even contradictions among the affirmations of various Fathers of the Church. In
some ways, the medieval theological method can be said to have arisen in large part in order to address
these differences in the patristic heritage.
This present project examines such a disagreement between St. Augustine of Hippo and St. John
of Damascus. The former is clearly the single most important Church Father in the West, while it could
be argued that the latter (the last of the Greek Fathers) is the greatest from the East. The issue at hand is
of central importance for the Church’s faith: the doctrine of the trinitarian God. The disagreement itself
regards the proper predication of the relation of the three persons of the Trinity to the divine nature, and
whether we can speak of the divine essence as a universal, that is, as a relation of three individuals to a
species. In other words, are the trinitarian persons three individuals of the one divine species of

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros.,
1948), prima pars, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2. Hereafter: ST I 1.8 ad 2.
1
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divinity? Augustine argues in the negative, whereas Damascene speaks affirmatively.2 The question is
important because, depending on how it is answered, it has enormous impact on our understanding of
God as Trinity, and thus a proper rendering of the true faith. Various answers could prove to be
erroneous and heretical, if they imply division in God such that he is no longer one. Because the
relation of the persons to the essence is the most basic element of the Church’s faith in the Trinity, it is
also the point at which trinitarian heresies go awry, either positing only one person or, conversely,
multiple essences. As will be shown below, the question of the universality of the divine nature, since it
concerns that very relationship of persons to essence, has immediate import regarding trinitarian
orthodoxy and heresy.
After addressing the specifics of the relative positions of Augustine and Damascene, and their
treatment by Peter Lombard in his Sentences in the following chapter, I will spend the bulk of this
paper examining Aquinas’s theology of the Trinity in order to determine his position on the matter and
the rationale he provides for it.3 The reason for the use of and emphasis on Aquinas is that he uniquely
With special gratitude to Mr. Scott Fennema, for his paper presented at the 2012 Pappas Patristic Institute’s Graduate
Student Conference (Brookline, Mass.) entitled, “Is Your God Universal or Not? Whether the Divine Essence is
Ontologically a Universal or Not,” together with my critical response, was the genesis of this present thesis paper.
3
For secondary literature on the trinitarian theology in Aquinas, see Gilles Emery, “The Doctrine of the Trinity in St.
Thomas Aquinas,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Daniel A. Keating, Thomas G. Weinandy, and John
P. Yocum (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 45-65; Gilles Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans.
Francesca Aran Murphy (New York: Oxford University, 2004); Gilles Emery, The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic
Doctrine of the Triune God (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2011); Gilles Emery, Trinity in Aquinas
(Ypsilanti, MI: Sapientia, 2003); Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity (New York:
Oxford University, 2011); Russell L. Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham (New York:
Cambridge University, 2010); Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St.
Thomas’ Theological Summa, Ia, q. 27-119, trans. Frederic C. Eckhoff (St. Louis: Herder, 1952); D. Juvenal Merriell, To
the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas’ Teaching (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1990); Anselm K. Min, Paths to the Triune God: An Encounter between Aquinas and Recent Theologies (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2005); Robert L. Richard, The Problem of an Apologetical Perspective in the
Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Rome: Gregorian University, 1963); Herwi Rikhof, “Trinity,” in The Theology
of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2005),
36-57; Timothy L. Smith, Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Theological Method (Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America, 2003).
For secondary literature on the theology of God in general in Aquinas, see also W. J. Hankey, God in Himself:
Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (New York: Oxford University, 1987); Christopher
Hughes, On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University, 1989); Rudi te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2006).
2
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provides a definitive account of the various concepts needed to thoroughly understand the relation of
individuals to a species and its applicability to the Godhead. After rounding out the first part of the
paper with a brief treatment on analogy and speaking about God, I move into the first of two main
sections of the paper.
The second part of this paper addresses the unity of essence and the plurality of persons in God
as understood by Aquinas. The first chapter of part two involves defining what is meant by “essence”
and “person” in reference to God, as a way to introduce the most basic concepts and language used by
Aquinas in his trinitarian theology. Afterwards in chapter five, the dual concepts of unity and plurality
are examined in detail in reference to the divine. Herein I present the first difficulty with Damascene’s
position in terms of Aquinas’s articulation of the divine unity, namely that Aquinas affirms not only a
specific unity in the Godhead but a numerical unity of essence. Then, in chapter six, I will conclude the
second part by readdressing our modes of predication of the divine in order to clarify even further what
is meant when attributing various things to him according to his oneness and his trinity. This treatment
is arranged according to three conceptual pairs: absolute and relative predications, singular and plural
terms, and concrete and abstract names.
In the third and final part, I will directly examine the relationship of species and individuals (in
chapter seven) and also the categories that characterize it, namely, universality and particularity (in
chapter eight) and communicability and incommunicability (in chapter nine). By examining each of
these relationships, I will demonstrate how it is that Aquinas proves on multiple levels that, properly
speaking, God cannot be said to be a divine species with three subordinate individuals. This will first
entail the proper subjects of generic and specific unities and the extent of such a type of unity. Further, I
will explain what is proper to individuals in the strict sense and how it is that the divine persons can
only be labelled individuals in a wide sense, building off of material on transcendental multitude in the
earlier section on unity and plurality. Then in the eighth chapter, I will focus on the role of participation
6

in the relationship of universality and particularity and the limited logical extension of particulars in
reference to their universal. Finally, I will conclude in chapter nine by noting difference between what
is logically common and what is really common, demonstrating that the essence and esse of God is
really common (that is, secundum rem) to the three divine persons of the Trinity. At the same time, I
will also show how it is that Aquinas recognizes some similarities (and thus allows for Damascene’s
position) between the species/individual relationship and that of the divine essence and persons.
Contemporary scholarship on this issue is infrequent, though interest can be found. Most of the
discussion largely focuses on the positions of various Fathers of the Church.4 For example, in a recent
article, Adam English proposes reintroducing St. Cyril of Jerusalem’s categories into trinitarian
theological discourse, namely referring to God as a genus and each person as a distinct species thereof.5
Recent authors have also explored the topics in other theologians such as John Philoponus6 and Bl.
John Duns Scotus.7 In an important article on the topic, the theologian Richard Cross attempts to
coordinate the Cappadocian and Augustinian traditions side-by-side and concludes that an account of
the divine essence as a universal from Damascene and his predecessors in the East is reconcilable with
the Western account derived from Augustine.8 Finally, there are also the more speculative accounts that
consider aspects of the question that will be treated below in their own fashion.9 Very recently, for

Richard Cross, “Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication in John of Damascus,” Mediaeval Studies 62
(2000): 69-124; Daniel F. Stramara, “Gregory of Nyssa Ad Graecos ‘How It Is That We Say There Are Three Persons In
The Divinity But Do Not Say There Are Three Gods’ (To the Greeks: Concerning the Commonality of Concepts),” Greek
Orthodox Theological Review 41 (1996): 375-391.
5
Adam C. English, “The Cyrilian Solution: Cyril of Jerusalem and Saul Kripke on Naming God,” New Blackfriars 94.1053
(Sept. 2013): 569-582.
6
Dirk Krausmüller, “Divine Genus, Divine Species: John Philoponus’ Impact on Contemporary Chalcedonian Theology,”
in The Mystery of Christ in the Fathers of the Church: Essays in Honour of D. Vincent Twomey, SVD, ed. Janet E. Rutherford and David Woods (Portland, OR: Four Courts, 2012).
7
Richard Cross, “Divisibility, Communicability, and Predicability in Duns Scotus’s Theories of the Common Nature,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11.1 (2003): 43-63.
8
Richard Cross, “Two Models of the Trinity?” The Heythrop Journal 43.3 (July 2002): 275-294.
9
See, for example, Peter van Inwagen, “And Yet There Are Not Three Gods but One God,” in Philosophy and the Christian
Faith, ed. T. V. Morris (Notre Dame, IN.: Notre Dame University, 1988), 241-278. Admittedly, more secondary literature in
general would be welcome to a topic as important as the right relation of the essence to the persons of the trinitarian
Godhead. As much as literature is difficult to find on this precise topic, it is even more difficult to find regarding Aquinas’s
thought on it. Herein lies the important contribution of this thesis paper.
4
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example, Fr. Thomas Joseph White, O.P., has restressed the fundamental importance of the principle of
divine simplicity in trinitarian doctrine, especially in regard to the proper articulation of the relationship
between persons and essence in God.10 What follows in this paper is a relatively unique Thomistic
analysis of this question, putting to use his trinitarian and metaphysical principles as a way to
understand all the critical implications of a relationship of universality between essence and persons in
the Godhead.

CHAPTER TWO: DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE FATHERS
St. Augustine of Hippo (d. 430)
The De Trinitate of St. Augustine of Hippo—being a comprehensive and sustained treatment of
the Trinity—stands as relatively unique among the Fathers of the Church.11 In it, he proves from sacred
scripture the textual evidence for the dogmatic account of God as both three and one. He then proceeds
to try to explain how it is that that trinity does not contradict the simplicity of the divine unity. He
searches for analogies adequate for conveying the profound unity of God while also accounting for the
distinction of plurality. “When it is asked what the three or who the three are, we seek to find a generic
or a specific name which may include the three together. But we come across none, because the
supereminent excellence of the divinity transcends all the limits of our wonted manner of speaking.”12
Augustine, therefore, in accepting the terminology of the faith’s tradition, notes that “if we say three
persons, then they have in common that which is meant by person.”13 Now, this leads him to inquire

Thomas Joseph White, “Divine Simplicity and the Holy Trinity,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 18.1 (Jan.
2016): 66-93.
11
Saint Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1981). For the
critical Latin edition, see Sancti Aurelii Augustini, De Trinitate Libri XV, ed. W. J. Mountain, Corpus Christianorum Series
Latina 50 (Turnholti: Typographi Brepolis Editores Pontificii, 1968). Cf. The Fifteen Books of Aurelius Augustinus, Bishop
of Hippo, on the Trinity, trans. Arthur West Haddan, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers III (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
Eerdmans, 1980). Hereafter, e.g., Augustine, De Trinitate I, 2 (4).
12
Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 4 (7).
13
Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 4 (7).
10
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that if there are three persons, why does the Catholic faith assert one divine essence and not three? The
three are all persons and so what is meant by person is common to them. The divine essence, however,
is also common to the three: “For the name essence is just as common to them, so common in fact that
each singly may be called essence, as the name substance or person is common to them.”14 The answer
for Augustine lies in the nature of God himself. “For so, because it is the same thing for Him to be God
as it is to be, it is just as wrong to say three essences as it is to say three gods.”15 Three divine essences
necessitates three gods because the essence of God is identical with his existence. Therefore, three
essences would mean—beyond a trinity of persons—three separate divine beings.
For this very reason, Augustine, in exploring possible analogies for the Trinity, utterly rejects
speaking about God as a genus or a species. “For if essence is the genus and substance or person the
species, as some think, I must omit what I have already said, that they ought to be called three
essences…”16 He uses the example of the horse: just as three horses (species) are also called three
animals (genus) and not one animal, so three persons (species) of God would be three gods (genus). “I
do declare that if essence is the genus, then a single essence has no species, just as, because animal is a
genus, a single animal has no species. Consequently, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not
three species of the one essence.” Augustine investigates further, taking up the possibility of referring
to the divine persons as individuals of a species. He concludes that “the same reasoning would apply.”
If, however, essence is a species as man is a species, but those are three which we call
substances or persons, then they have the same species in common, just as Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob have in common that species that is called man; not as man is subdivided into
several men; for this is wholly impossible, because one man is already a single man. Why,
therefore, is one essence subdivided into three substances or persons? For if essence is a
species as man is, then one essence is as one man is. We say of any three men … that they
are one nature. Is it in this sense that we also say in the Trinity three substances one essence,
or three persons one substance or essence?17

Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 4 (8). Augustine admits that substantia and persona can be used interchangeably in Latin to
refer to the three hypostases as they are called in Greek.
15
Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 4 (9).
16
Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 6 (11).
17
Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 6 (11).
14
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In his own roundabout way, Augustine seeks to thoroughly examine the possibility of speaking about
the Trinity according to species and individual, such as we speak of three men of one human nature.
The key to his conclusion lies in his comment that although we speak of one God made up of three
persons, it is “wholly impossible” to speak of one man made up of or “subdivided into” three men. He
admits that there is “some kind of a similarity” between how individual men relate to the species of
humanity and how the persons relate to the divine essence, but ultimately judges the metaphor to be
limited and unhelpful. “Therefore, we do not use these terms according to genus and species…”
Instead, Augustine asserts the profound unity of the persons and the essence, so as to dismiss a relation
of potency implicit in the analogy of species and individuals:
[W]e do not say three persons from the same essence, just as though essence were one thing
and person another. …[W]e say three men one nature, or three men of the same nature, so
we can also say three men from the same nature, because three other such men can also
exist from the same nature. On the contrary, in the essence of the Trinity no other person
whatsoever can exist in any way from the same essence.18
The divine essence, therefore, is nothing other than the trinity of persons. To be the one simple God and
to be a Trinity of persons are fundamentally the same in the Godhead.
St. John of Damascus (d. 749)
In his monumental work, Fount of Knowledge, St. John of Damascus synthesizes and transmits
the orthodox theological tradition of the Greek Fathers of the Church in the section of the text known as
De fide orthodoxa.19 In the context of explaining the composite union of the Incarnate Word of God,
Damascene makes a point of clarifying what he means by the terms used in the Christological formula
of two natures or substances in one person. In reference to Christ’s divinity and humanity, he uses the
terms nature (φύσις) and essence/substance (οὐσία) interchangeably. What he intends by each of them

Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 6 (11).
Saint John of Damascus, Writings, trans. Frederic H. Chase, Jr. (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1958). For the critical
Greek edition of the De fide orthodoxa, see Bonifatius Kotter, ed., Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos 2: Ekdosis
akribes tes orthodoxou pisteos, PTS 12 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973). Hereafter, each section of the Fount of Knowledge will
be cited under its own title, e.g. Damascene, De fide III, 6.
18
19
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is that whereby a thing is what it is. He articulates this whatness as what is common to many, even
applying this perfection of commonality to the essence of divinity.
We have repeatedly said that substance (οὐσία) is one thing and person (ὑπόστασις) another,
and that substance means the common species (τὸ κοινὸν καὶ περιεκτικὸν εἶδος) including
the persons that belong to the same species—as, for example, God, man—while person
indicates an individual (ἄτομον), as Father, Son, Holy Ghost, Peter, Paul.20
With this articulation, Damascene asserts that the Trinitarian persons are examples of both persons and
individuals, which relate to the essence of God as to a common species. In this analysis, Damascene
consciously affirms the relegation of individuals as particulars to the universal species: “Things that are
common and universal are predicated of particulars subordinate to them. … For every substance is
common to the persons included under it.”21 Damascene seems unconcerned, however, with the risk of
tritheism in this analogy, for he explicitly recognizes the profound unity of the divine persons and thus
does not draw too strong a conclusion from his assertion of persons as individuals participating in the
divine species.22
The same issue arises in Damascene’s Elementary Introduction to Dogma.23 He begins the work
by clearly stating that “the incomprehensible Godhead is a supersubstantial substance, and nature, and
form,” while “the Father, Son and all-Holy Ghost are hypostases and persons.” That is, each Trinitarian
person is “a perfect substance and a perfect person.”24 He immediately clarifies that relationship of

Damascene, De fide III, 4. Cf. ch. 6: “The Word possesses the community of substance and the individuality of person.”
Damascene, De fide III, 6. He does clarify, however, that “a thing is a particular not in that it possesses a part of the
nature, because it does not have such a part, but in that it is particular in number, as an individual. … The substance is
predicated of the person because the substance is complete in each of the persons of the same species.” On the other hand,
he later seems to explain his hesitancy to this partial possession of a nature by concluding that it would mean that each
person would effectively be of a different nature: “And it is not possible to find a partial and individuating nature of
substance, since it would then be necessary to say that the same persons were of the same substance and of different
substances, and that the Holy Trinity was in its divinity both of the same substance and of different substances.
Consequently, the same nature is found in each of the Persons.” Instead, each of the Trinitarian persons is perfect God:
“Thus, then, we confess that the nature of the divinity is entirely and completely in each one of its Persons.”
22
Cf. De fide III, 5: “The three Persons of the Holy Trinity are united without confusion and are distinct without separation
and have number without the number causing division … for we recognize that the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost
are one God.”
23
PG 95.99-112. John Joseph Gavigan, “Saint John Damascene’s Elementary Introduction to Dogma: Introduction,
Translation, and Commentary” (MA diss., Catholic University of America, 1939).
24
Damascene, Dogma I (p. 4).
20
21
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hypostases to nature: “So that nature, and substance, and form are that which is common and which
contains the hypostases of the same substance. But hypostasis and individual and person are that which
is particular, that is to say, they are each of those things which are contained under the same species.”25
While Damascene is careful to never include God in the Porphyrian tree of substances in the Fount of
Knowledge,26 he does, however, attribute substance to God in a “supersubstantial” manner in his
Elementary Introduction: “Substance, which embraces in a super-substantial way the uncreated
Godhead and (embraces) in its concept and content all creation, is the most generic genus. …
Bodiless[, intellectual, and immortal] substance embraces God, angel, soul, demon…”27 Damascene
here clearly places God within the genus of substance and includes the divinity as a subaltern species
thereof. He then makes this move explicit in what follows: “There is, therefore, on the one hand,
hypostasis, the individual, and person; for example the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. And
embracing them is a species—the supersubstantial and incomprehensible Godhead.”28 To clarify his
classification, he cites Michael and Gabriel as examples of the angelic nature and Peter, Paul, and John
as hypostases of the species of humanity, the latter of which are strikingly similar to the same treatment
of the divine species in his De fide quoted above.
The first section of Damascene’s Fount of Knowledge—the Philosophical Chapters or
Dialectica—constitutes a philosophical introduction to the rest of the work, determining the usage of
key terms such as genus, species, individual, and hypostasis. His account here in the Dialectica will
help us in our current task of understanding how exactly Damascene employs the terms in reference to
the Trinity in the De fide and in the Elementary Introduction. Damascene once again is heavily reliant

Damascene, Dogma II (p. 6).
Saint John of Damascus, Dialectica XXX, in Writings, trans. Chase (p. 56): “…that which is common to and affirmed of
several things ... they called substance, and nature, and form—as, for example, angel, man… Form, also, and species mean
the same thing as nature. However, the particular [the holy Fathers] called individual, and person, and hypostasis or
individual substance—as, for example, would be Peter and Paul.”). For the critical Greek edition of the Dialectica, see
Bonifatius Kotter, ed., Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos 1: Institutio elementaris. Capita philosophica
(Dialectica), PTS 7 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969).
27
Damascene, Dogma VII (pp. 14, 16).
28
Damascene, Dogma VII (pp. 16, 18).
25
26
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on Porphyry,29 especially for the categorization of substances into genus and species as a relationship
of logical superiority and inferiority. “For genus is divided into species, is more general than species,
contains the species, and is higher...”30 Just as the species is “substantial and subaltern” to genus,31
species itself has subject to it either other species (making it also a genus) or several individuals. In
regard to the latter, “species is that which is predicated in respect to their common essence of several
things which are numerically different.”32 This numerical difference or distinction arises because the
individual (ἄτομον)—a term that has multiple meanings—fundamentally denotes unity and
indivision.33 From this understanding, then, “the hypostasis subsisting in itself means the individual
and the distinct person.”34 Damascene makes this even more explicit when he says that hypostasis
“means the existence of an individual substance in itself. In this sense, it signifies the individual, that
which is numerically different, which is to say, Peter and Paul…”35 When the hypostases of the Trinity
are referred to as individuals of the divine species later in the Fount of Knowledge, Damascene clearly
understands them in a way remarkably similar to the way that individual human persons relate to the
species of humanity.
This way of speaking of the Trinity is not unique to Damascene, however. In fact, he inherited
the analogy of individuals and species from the Cappadocian fathers. St. Basil the Great explicitly says

Cf. Frederic H. Chase, Jr., “Introduction,” in Saint John of Damascus, Writings, xxvii. Damascene almost literally quotes
large sections from Porphyry and Ammonius Hermeae in the Dialectica.
30
Damascene, Dialectica IX (p. 30). Cf. ch. X (p. 34): “Again, when the species is divided, it communicates both its name
and its definition to those inferior to itself.”
31
Damascene, Dialectica X (p. 31).
32
Damascene, Dialectica X (p. 31). Cf. p. 35: “This last, then, is the most specific species, which comes immediately above
the individuals, and which they define by saying that it is a species which is predicated in the category of essence of several
numerically different things.” My emphasis. Cf. also ch. XX (p. 50): “Genus and species have this in common: that they are
predicated of the essence of several things; that by nature they are prior to those things that come under them; and that each
is a whole something.”
33
Cf. Damascene, Dialectica XI (p. 41): “That which cannot be divided or partitioned is called individual, as the point, the
instance of the time which is now, and the unit. These are said to be quantitiless (that is to say, without quantity). … The
term individual, however, is principally used as meaning that which, although it is divisible, does not maintain its species
intact after the division. … It is with this latter kind of individual—namely, that which shows the individuality of the
substance—that the philosophers are concerned.”
34
Damascene, Dialectica XXIX (p. 54).
35
Damascene, Dialectica XLII (p. 67).
29
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about the Trinity: “The distinction between ousia and hypostasis is the same as that between the general
and the particular; as, for instance, between the animal and the particular man.”36 While Damascene
stresses the fundamental distinction of the Trinitarian persons when he uses suspect language like, “in
the Holy Trinity a hypostasis is the timeless mode of each [eternal] existence,”37 it must also be noted
that, in the end, the last of the Greek Fathers is ever conscious of the oneness of God and his duty to
maintain the orthodox faith. “We believe in Father and Son and Holy Ghost; one Godhead in three
hypostases; one will, one operation, alike in three persons … equal in nature, exceedingly substantial
… one God and not three Gods; one Lord the Holy Trinity discovered in three hypostases.”38

Peter Lombard (d. 1160)
The discrepancy between Augustine and Damascene comes to a head in Peter Lombard’s
Sentences,39 wherein the Lombard sides with Augustine and the Western tradition against using the
terms genus, species, and individual to speak about the Trinity.
…[S]uch is the equality of the three persons and so undifferentiated their greatness that,
when we say that the three persons are one essence or substance, we do not predicate it as
a genus [made up] of species, or as species [made up] of individuals. For the divine essence
is not a genus, the three persons are not a species; neither is the divine essence a species,
nor are the three persons individuals.40
To refute the first possibility, namely of the divine essence constituting a genus of which each person
participates as a species, the Lombard quotes from Augustine’s De Trinitate, a text that I have cited

St. Basil, Letters, No. 236:6. Cf. Letter 38 (to his brother Gregory), MG 32, 329, NPNF VIII, 138-139: “But the
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above: “If essence is the genus, and person is the species, as some feel, then they ought to be called
three substances as they are called three persons.”41 Regarding the refutation of those who wish to
speak of the divine essence as a species with three participating individuals, he once again resorts to the
authority of Augustine. The Lombard sees two distinct arguments in the texts cited above and proffers
them in a more direct and paraphrased quotation:
But neither is the divine essence a species, and the persons are not individuals, as man is a
species and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are individuals. For if essence is a species, like man,
then just as we do not say that Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac are one man, so we will not say
that the three persons are one essence.42
By paraphrasing Augustine, the Lombard summarizes the main thrust of his argument, namely that to
assert that the divine essence is a species would, in effect, result in the contradiction of the article of
faith that there is only one God. If the divine essence were a species, there would be three divine
essences just as there are three divine persons.
The Lombard returns to this topic of the relation between the persons and the divine essence in
invoking the authority of Damascene as an objection to Augustine’s points.
But some things which Catholic commentators on sacred Scripture have handed down in
their writings seem to contradict these statements. In these works, they seem to signify that
the divine essence is something common and universal, like a species, but the three persons
are three particulars, or three individuals differing in number.43
The Lombard goes on to name John of Damascus uniquely and quote the two passages from his De fide
offered above. In reference to the explicit examples of God as “a common and collective species of
persons who are similar in species” and Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each as a hypostasis that “denotes
an individual,”44 the Lombard reacts:

Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 6 (11), quoted at Lombard, Sentences I, 19, 7 (78), 2.
Lombard, Sentences I, 19, 7 (78), 4, paraphrasing Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 6 (11).
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See how he says plainly that substance is a universal, but hypostasis a particular; and that
God is a species, like man, and that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are individuals, like
Peter and Paul, and that they differ in number. These words seem to wholly contradict the
opinion of Augustine stated above. … We can and must certainly say this, that the words
which Augustine has handed down to us above are to be held without any hesitation.45
He immediately judges, however, that the analogy used by Damascene, though misguided, is “capable
of a right understanding” but only for “a very pious reader and interpreter.”46 After his attempts at
humility stating that he is not the best candidate for an explanation, he proceeds to offer his own
explanation anyway.
The Lombard believes that Damascene does not intend to speak of the divine essence as a
universal and the divine persons as particulars “as they are taken in philosophical teaching,” but rather
“by analogy [per similitudinem]” and “by likeness of predication [propter similitudinem
praedicationis].”
Just as in their usage what is predicated of many is called common or universal, and what
[is predicated] of one only is called a particular or individual, so here the divine essence is
called universal because it is said of all the persons together and of each severally, but each
single one of the persons is called a particular because it is not predicated of the others in
common, nor of each of the others severally.47
He acknowledges that Damascene sees a likeness or metaphor between the universal and the divine
essence as predicated of many and likewise the particular and the divine persons as not predicated of
each other. The analogy of species and individual, to the Lombard, according to its proper sense
implies contradiction with the Catholic faith, but it can in a limited way reach some truth about God.
And so John, pondering this likeness [similitudinem] between eternal and temporal things,
applied to eternal things the terms of ‘universality’ and ‘particularity,’ which properly
pertain to temporal things. But Augustine, concluding that the unlikeness between the
above-mentioned things was greater than the likeness, refused to apply the above terms to
the excellence of the Trinity.48
Thus, the Lombard allows for both Damascene’s assertion and Augustine’s refusal on the grounds that
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Augustine condemns speaking in this way according to the strict sense of what is implied and that
Damascene is speaking not strictly but only metaphorically because of the likeness he sees in created
things.

CHAPTER THREE: SPEAKING ABOUT GOD
The purpose of this paper is not to extrapolate from Damascene himself all that is needed to
have a proper and complete understanding of his own use of the categories of species and individuals in
reference to the Trinity, but rather to seek the assistance of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) for a refined
and further systematized conceptual understanding of all the elements involved in the relation of
particulars to a species and how that relation is or is not possible of the relation of the divine persons to
the Godhead. After a brief discursus on analogy and how it is that we can speak accurately about God, I
will turn first to the issue of the unity of the divine essence and the plurality of the Trinitarian persons,
and then to the issue of the relation between individuals and the species. Finally, I will conclude by
applying what is discussed in the latter section to the relation of God’s unity of essence and trinity of
persons.

A Brief Discursus on Analogy
Before departing on an intricate examination of the interconnected concepts used by Aquinas in
his theology of the Trinity, it is necessary to note how it is that we can use human language to describe
the utterly transcendent deity. Aquinas asserts that we cannot know God directly in our current state of
life, but only indirectly as we know the cause from its effects.49 Therefore, every possible thing that is
said of God is always said in relation to our knowledge of creatures, his effects. Every word used to

49

See esp. ST I 2.1.
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describe something in or about God is a word first understood and used of creatures, and then applied
to God. The theologian Joseph Wawrykow thus cautions us: “When we speak of God and perforce
must use terms of God that we know first of all through creatures, we must attend to the ways that God
eludes our categories, to the ways that God is not to be reduced to a thing of this world.”50 We have to
be very judicious when it comes to our use of language when speaking of God, most especially when
trying to speak of his inner trinitarian life. The task of this current project is essentially an exercise in
refining the precision of language needed to describe the Trinity, especially the relation of what is
distinct and multiple (the divine persons) to what is simple and one (the divine essence).
Aquinas notes the fundamental relationship between language and knowledge when he says that
“everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.”51 Therefore, “since we cannot name an
object except as we understand it (for names are signs of things understood), we cannot give names to
God except in terms of perfections perceived in other things that have their origin in Him.”52 Just as we
know God as the first cause of all creatures, whatever perfections we perceive in creatures must be
present in God preeminently and to an infinite degree, such that the perfections in God are more unlike
than like the perfections in creatures.
Effects that fall short of their causes do not agree with them in name and nature. Yet, some
likeness must be found between them, since it belongs to the nature of action that an agent
produce its like, since each thing acts according as it is in act. The form of an effect,
therefore, is certainly found in some measure in a transcending cause, but according to
another mode and another way. … So, too, God gave things all their perfections and
thereby is both like and unlike all of them.53
Despite the infinite unlikeness, there is still a likeness and thus a relationship between what is in
creatures and what is in God. Thus, we know God and—to a limited degree—what he is like “from
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creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion.”54 As God is the first cause of
creation, infinitely beyond creation, and unlike created things, we can thus name him from the
knowledge attained in this life. Thus, we are able to speak meaningfully about God inasmuch as what
we know of him is derived from our knowledge of creatures and as they have a relationship, likeness,
and participation in the perfections that are in God preeminently. This way of speaking about God is
called analogy.55
Analogical naming does not claim to have an exhaustive or even an adequate grasp of what God
truly is in his very being.56 No, instead, analogy holds a middle ground between asserting that whatever
we say of God is exactly correlative in meaning as what is said of man and creation (univocal
predication) and asserting that nothing at all can accurately be said of God (equivocal predication).57
Therefore, analogy is a tool by which the theologian and philosopher can speak of realities in God
accurately while realizing that God in his transcendence cannot be contained by any of our categories.
In this way, then, various terms are used of God not as synonyms, but so as to describe our various
intellectual notions about God, “even though they signify what is in reality the same thing in God.”58
This is why we can say, for example, that the three persons are the divine essence and yet speak of
them under the aspect of multiple distinct relations versus under the aspect of the unity of divine
simplicity.
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Because our terminology for God is formed according to our mode of intellection, we must also
maintain certain distinctions for speaking about God that reflect our various intellectual notions. In our
mode of signification, therefore, we cannot confuse various, discrepant terms as equally or similarly
applied to him even if those terms refer to the same reality in God. Thus, some analogous terms are
more accurately applied to him than others. In this way, we can say that there are proper and improper
terms of analogy for God. The purest and highest perfections in creatures are attributed to God more
properly than what can only be said of God metaphorically. “When that which the term signifies is
appropriate to God, it is applied to God in its proper sense, for instance, good, wise and the like…”59
Elsewhere, Aquinas asserts that these analogous names for God “express these perfections absolutely,
without any such mode of participation being part of their signification as the words ‘being,’ ‘good,’
‘living,’ and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God [proprie dicuntur de Deo].”60 In
the reality of being, goodness, life, wisdom, personhood,61 etc., signified by their corresponding names,
the names are applied to God primarily since the realities are most excellently present in him.62 But
according to their mode of signification, they primarily apply to creatures.
This current project requires that these distinctions be kept in mind, since whatever terms we
use of God and the Trinity are used according to analogy. In what follows, I will examine some select
terms that are central to the question at hand, namely, whether the common essence of the Trinity can
accurately be understood as a universal. Most basically, God is spoken of as one in “essence,” “nature,”
“form,” or “substance,” with three “persons,” “hypostases,” “supposita,” or “subsistences,” distinct
according to opposite “relations” of origin. The use of essence and its related terms will allow us to see
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the “unity” or oneness of God, while the persons and its related terms will show the manner in which
we can speak of “distinction” or “plurality” in him. This relationship between unity and plurality will
elicit a second treatment of the manner in which we speak of God, that is, as he is Trinity. Thereafter, I
will discuss the conceptual relationship between “genus,” “species,” and “individual,” followed by the
more general treatment of “universals” and “particulars,” and finally the “communication” of being
implied by these relationships. Moving forward, then, it is critical to maintain the distinction between
what is properly said of God and what is only metaphorically spoken of him, as well as the nuance that
these absolute perfections are preeminently in him according to reality, while their mode of predication
is limited to our creaturely knowledge of the world.

21

PART II: UNITY OF ESSENCE AND PLURALITY OF PERSONS
CHAPTER FOUR: ESSENCE AND PERSON
For Aquinas, essence and person are the two concepts on which the whole study of God rests.
The structure of the treatise on God in the Summa theologiae, in fact, proceeds according to two
approaches, namely, the unity of God in essence and the relative distinction of persons. The theologian
Joseph Wawrykow describes the connection implicit in this division of the text:
In the first part of the treatise on God, Aquinas stresses what the three persons share in
common, as one and the same God. In the second part of the treatise, he stresses the
distinction of persons. … The divine essence and the divine persons eternally are, and are
identical. There is a certain economy in this order of procedure, going from the common
to the proper.63
Aquinas himself explicitly asserts that “in the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the
essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct.”64 The nature of what
is common and what is distinct is fundamental to our present question of the possibility of speaking
about God as a universal. Therefore, in what follows, I will briefly describe how Aquinas uses these
concepts of essence and person—and their related terms—in the context of his theology of God. These
terms of have real, analogical meaning when applied to God. In reality, everything in God is identical
with God, but in our limited understanding, we must be careful to coordinate these logical distinctions
with an accurate denomination of what is in God according to our various modes of predication.

Essence
When Aquinas refers to the “essence” (essentia) of a thing, most fundamentally, he means the
principle whereby that thing is what it is.65 It is the “internal constitution of a thing.”66 All created
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beings are composed of essence and existence, whereby a thing’s essence determines or sets a limit on
its existence according to a relationship of potency to act. As essence constitutes the intelligible
structure of a being, it is thus “that which makes a thing to be a member of a species, held in common
by all the members of that species.”67 So, essence is also that which is or is able to be held in common.
In reference to God, our reference to the divine essence symbolizes all that God is (i.e., his “whatness”
or quiddity) and so also articulates his absolute unity of being.
In addition to the divine essence, Aquinas will also refer to God’s quiddity in terms of his
“nature” (natura) and his “form” (forma). Nature further qualifies essence inasmuch as that essence is
the principle of motion and operation in a thing.68 Thus, “nature in a certain way implies the idea of a
principle, but essence does not.”69 Form, on the other hand, usually refers to a complementary part of a
thing as it is paired with matter and therefore is used to refer to the whole only to the extent that it is the
principal part in that pair.70 Since there is no composition of form and matter in God, he is referred to as
a separate or subsistent form, “a form complete in itself” that exists “independently of matter.”71 In
fact, Aquinas says that “God is absolute form [ipsa forma], or rather absolute being [ipsum esse].”72
Basically, for Aquinas, form, nature, and essence all refer to the divinity in the Godhead, the “what”
that God is.73 The emphasis on the use of the essence as common to the three persons of the Trinity is
important, however. “Because ‘nature’ designates the principle of action while ‘essence’ comes from
being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which

Robert Pasnau and Christopher Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004), 244.
Cf. Wuellner, 79.
69
ST I 42.3 ad 4; cf. De pot. 9.2 ad 11.
70
Cf. Wuellner, 47.
71
Wuellner, 48. Cf. ST I 3.2: “Whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now
God is the first agent, since he is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of his essence a form; and not composed of matter
and form.”
72
ST I 3.7.
73
Cf. SCG IV, 7 (12): “By the form of God nothing is understood but the divine nature.”; ST I 39.2: “…in God the essence
is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification.”; ST III 2.1: “We are now speaking of
‘nature’ as it signifies the essence, or the what-it-is, or the quiddity of the species.”
67
68

23

give heat; but only those things can be said to be of ‘one essence’ which have one being [unum esse].”74
Therefore, because the three persons are one in being, Aquinas typically refers to the divinity as the
essence of God because of this unique implication whereby unity of essence means the common esse of
the Godhead.
Sometimes Aquinas even uses the word “substance” (substantia) to refer to the divine essence,
but this term almost always requires clarification because of its twofold usage. Substance is divided
into “first substance” and “second substance.” First substance refers to the singular and individual
being, whereas second substance is the general species or form constitutive of those singulars whereby
they are what they are.75 The first substance is further understood as a subject that “subsists,” i.e., exists
in itself and not in another, and that “substands,” i.e., sustains accidents as inhering in itself.76 Aquinas
is clear that, as a simple form, “God cannot be a subject”77 and also that the term substance necessarily
implies a distinction between the individual thing and its quiddity.78 In reference to God, therefore,
substance is purely an analogical term.79 Insofar as it is limited to that which exists by itself, however,
“‘substance’ can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence.”80 This limited
understanding of a first substance Aquinas calls a “subsistence” (subsistentia).81
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Person
In reference to God, Aquinas adopts the tradition of the Church in denominating the three things
in the Trinity each as an individual “person” (persona). Person is used to indicate the real distinctions
in the Godhead. “‘Person’ in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature.”82 It also “signifies
what is most perfect” or complete “in all nature.”83 Aquinas puts to use and clarifies the definition of
person coined by Boethius, namely “an individual substance of a rational nature,”84 such that a person
is a subsistent thing of an intellectual nature.85 Two features, therefore, constitute personhood for
Aquinas: subsistence and intelligence. Person is therefore fittingly applied to God, “as that He is the
supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being.”86 The three subsistent things of
the one intelligent and divine nature are three persons in one God.
Insofar as person indicates an individual subsistence, it can also be termed a hypostasis or
suppositum. The suppositum is “the individual subsisting in a nature.”87 In the same way, hypostasis
refers to a subsistent thing or subsistence.88 “Two things are requisite to constitute a hypostasis. First it
must be self-subsistent and undivided in itself: secondly it must be distinct from other hypostases of the
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same nature.”89 Hypostasis and suppositum are terms more general than person, since person qualifies
the nature of the subsistence as intellectual.90 Therefore, “a person is nothing other than a suppositum
of a rational nature.”91 The persons of the Trinity are supposita or hypostases, each self-subsistent and
distinct from each other though united in the divine essence.
The distinction of persons in the Trinity presupposes an order between them wherein they are
perfectly God all together and each individually, but not three gods. The persons, therefore, according
to Aquinas are constituted by relations or relative personal properties. “Relation in its own proper
meaning signifies only what refers to another [solum respectum ad aliud].”92 As real relations in God,93
they are not accidentally adherent in him but simply and solely are understood as reference to
another.94 Because “real relation is where one thing really depends on another … in a certain respect,”95
the relations in God show relative dependence of origin insofar as there is an order of principle and
procession.
Accordingly in God we find the origin of one from another … without prejudice to the
unity of the essence. For whenever one thing originates from another there must be a real
relation. … [In God, the relation is] on the part of both [things], when to wit that which
originates attains to the nature of its principle…96
In this way, “the divine persons [are multiplied] solely by the relation of some procession” of one
coming forth from another.97 Further, because nothing in God can be other than identical with the
divine essence itself, the relations themselves are self-subsistent just as God himself is subsistent.98 In
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God, “relation has no other existence [esse] than that of the substance.”99 Thus, the identity of relation
and God’s substance allows the relation to constitute something subsistent and not merely relative.100
“Relation as such distinguishes the hypostasis: while as identical with the divine essence it constitutes
the hypostasis, and does both inasmuch as it is both relation and divine essence.”101 Real relations of
origin in God both distinguish the hypostases as personal properties102 and constitute those properties
as subsistent persons.103 In God, therefore, the persons are “subsistent opposite relations.”104 The
persons are both identified with the divine essence and also distinct in their very relativity to each
other.

The Identity of the Persons and the Essence in God
Aquinas asserts that “the Godhead is wholly and perfectly in each of the three persons
according to its proper mode of existence”105 such that the persons themselves are not simply relations
but also “the essence which is not spoken of relatively.”106 In other words, “in God essence is not really
distinct from person; and yet … the persons are really distinguished from each other.”107 The persons—
individually and collectively—are really the same as the divine essence.108 So, while on the one hand,
the persons “in reference to one another” are “regarded as mutually distinct not as united together,”109
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on the other hand, they “are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the
essence,”110 for “the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation.”111 The
personal relative properties in God are really distinct from each other but really identical to the divine
essence. The persons, while really identical with the essence, are logically distinct from the essence
such that we must speak of each according to the mode of our understanding, as the terms signify either
what is absolutely united in quiddity or what is relatively distinct.112 “In so far as relation implies
respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term. Thus it
is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and differs only in its
mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the
name of essence.”113 To treat the persons as three individuals of a species, then, may prove to stretch
the relative distinctions too far. The persons are only distinct in reference to each other by relative
personal properties. If the relations are subsistent precisely because they are really identical with the
divine essence, then the persons would need to be distinct not only by mere relation but also
numerically so (i.e., in the absolute sense), thus negating the identity of person and essence. As will be
demonstrated later, the relationship of species and individuals requires that the individuals are distinct
from each other even on the basis of their individual essences. In other words, the three divine persons
would not be identical with one simple divine essence, but each would have a distinct instantiation of
the common essence. There would need to be three essences for the three divine persons, the unity
among them no longer one of identity. What follows will help to illuminate this problem further.
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CHAPTER FIVE: UNITY AND PLURALITY
After treating the notions of essence and person as applied to the Trinity, we naturally must
inquire further into their relation inasmuch as there is only one essence but three persons. Because God
is truly distinguished in hypostases by relative personal properties, we must ask whether a true plurality
in hypostases is opposed to the unity of the divine essence. The trinitarian problem of the one God and
the many divine persons is akin to the old question regarding “the one and the many” in philosophy.
Aquinas explains the classical take on the one and the many: “There is nothing to prevent a thing which
in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be
undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way ‘one,’ and in another way ‘many.’”114
The one and the many in philosophical debate concerns how it is that the many individual beings that
possess the same essence though in distinct supposits are united in species. This quotation perfectly
raises the question whether God is a similar case of the one and the many according to the unity of
species and multiplicity of participants in that species.
God is One and Three
Everyone who professes the Catholic faith accepts that there is both unity and plurality in God.
The Fathers of the Church and the great doctors who came after them are in agreement on this point.
Aquinas, too, readily admits that there is oneness (unity) and threeness (trinity) in God without
contradiction. “[I]n the Godhead there is something threefold which is not opposed to the unity and
simplicity of the divine essence.”115 He also acknowledges that the divine being as one and three is an
article of divine and Catholic faith that positively reveals something about the nature of God: “What is
of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and
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One.”116 The Athanasian Creed contains a brief yet wonderfully rich formula that has informed the
theological tradition. It says that God is to be venerated, “trinity in unity and unity in trinity [trinitas in
unitate et unitas in trinitate].”117 St. Gregory Nazianzen has a similar expression: “For they are divided
without division, if I may so say; and they are united in division. For the Godhead is one in three, and
the three are one…”118 Augustine states that “we even speak of the Trinity itself as God alone,”
meaning that the Trinity is the one and perfectly simple God.119 The one true God is Trinity, therefore,
and the Trinity is the one true God. What is plural in God is perfectly identifiable with what is one in
God. In fact, this unity among the divine persons is the greatest unity possible or even conceivable. St.
Bernard of Clairvaux states that “among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the
first place.”120 The threeness of God is also the greatest oneness.
How, then, is God three? What constitutes his threeness as distinct from his oneness? Aquinas
answers: “To those who ask, ‘Three what?’ we answer, with Augustine, ‘Three persons.’”121 The three
divine persons make up the Trinity. This word “trinity” goes beyond positing plurality in God in that it
determines the exact number of that plurality, namely, three. God is not only plural (i.e., many persons),
he is precisely three. “The name ‘Trinity’ in God signifies the determinate number of persons. And so
the plurality of persons in God requires that we should use the word trinity; because what is
indeterminately signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate manner.” (ST I 31.1) In
other words, we can speak of a plurality in God, but to speak of a trinity qualifies that plurality and
determines it so as to reflect the exact number of the three persons revealed to exist as one God.
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Now, while all who adhere to the Catholic faith accept that there is not only unity in God but
also plurality according to a trinity, the real question to answer is how to distinguish the unity and the
plurality and, thus, to see how they do not contradict each other. The implications for the proper
understanding of unity and plurality in God are fundamental. If we err in our understanding of the
relationship between how God is unity and how he is trinity, we risk falling into opposing heresies.
Augustine is quick to warn about the error of tritheism, which stresses the plurality of the Trinity so far
that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are no longer one God but three distinct and separate gods. On the flip
side, the Unitarian error arises from emphasizing the unity of the Trinity to the point that the three
persons are reduced to the solitary individuality of one person. While tritheism neglects the unity of
God, unitarianism totally neglects God’s plurality. Aquinas asserts, therefore, that both unity and
plurality in God need to be maintained for the proper, orthodox understanding of the Trinity, which
strikes a balance between these opposing errors: “solitude is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of
gods by unity.”122 To properly understand the relationship between the unity of God and the trinity of
persons, we must first understand how it is that God is one.
Numerical Unity and Transcendental Unity
Aquinas speaks of two types of unity or oneness. “One” is either numerical as the principle of
number or it is transcendental, that is, as a property of being as such. Insofar as “one” is described as a
unit of measurement, it is the principle of number. Aquinas calls this “one” numerical unity. It is
fundamentally linked to matter insofar as there is something to be measured, since nonmaterial things
cannot strictly speaking have magnitude (e.g., volume, mass, length, etc.). Numerical unity, then, is
predicated only of material things and is only abstracted from matter in idea by our minds but is never
really separate from matter. In this way, we can speak of numerical unity being in the genus of
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mathematics.123 This numerical unity always exists “in some subject”124 and thus adds “a reality to
‘being,’” as it “belong[s] to the genus of quantity.”125 The “one” that is the principle of number always
refers to material substances that are quantifiable.126
This raises the question, then, as to whether we can in any way speak of number in God.
Aquinas makes a distinction that is necessary when speaking of number and God, namely between
number itself and what is numbered. “In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number and the
persons numbered.”127 When we speak about number in reference to God, we need to make clear,
therefore, that there is a difference between number itself and the things numbered.
Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three and four; and number as existing
in things numbered, as two men and two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely
or abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in him, and thus
number in him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as number regarded apart
from things numbered exists only in the intellect.128
Number taken in a simple or abstracted sense can be thought of in God, but only in our limited mode of
understanding. In other words, simple numbers insofar as they are numbers (as “two,” “sixteen,” “one
hundred,” generally speaking), exist only in the mind. Therefore, we can say number is in God
inasmuch as we recognize that it has no real bearing as units of measurement applied to God as he
exists in reality. As God exists in reality, there are persons numbered, but without any measurement. “A
determinate number, if taken as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But
when we speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no
place, because the magnitude of the three persons is the same…”129 If we cannot speak about the things
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numbered in God according to measure, we can only number God according to our mode of
knowledge, that is, as abstracted in our intellect. Properly speaking, God has no number. Unity
considered as the principle of number and as a principle of measure is, therefore, not attributed to God.
Besides the unity that is the principle of number (number as measured by one), Aquinas speaks
of another type of unity. “One” is not only a unit of measurement but also metaphysical or
transcendental inasmuch as “each thing is ‘one’ by its substance.”130 Unity in this transcendental sense,
in contrast to numerical unity, refers to a metaphysical entity whose unity is independent of matter. It is
called “transcendental” because it is convertible with being. Each being is unified in itself and is one
being. All beings are unities. In reality, nothing distinguishes a being and its unity; it is a unity simply
by its being. Of course, the signification of unity differs from that of being in our intellects, insofar as it
adds to the notion of being a further understanding. “The unity that is convertible with being adds
nothing to being except the negation of division; not that it signifies indivision only, but substance with
indivision: for one is the same as individual being.”131 As God is perfect and infinite being, he is also
perfectly simple and thus perfectly one and undivided. The unity of God is the greatest unity possible.
Aquinas proves that there is and can be only one God.132 Divine simplicity requires it. The
nature of God as pure act and the perfect identity of essence and existence requires it. Bernard Wuellner
categorizes the unity of God as a real, natural, metaphysical, simple, and unique unity in being and in
essence.133 God is not numerically one but metaphysically one insofar as he completely lacks division.
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“One” which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things.
For “one” the principle of number belongs to the “genus” of mathematics, which are
material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But “one” which is convertible
with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although
in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, he is known
to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of
privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that he is incorporeal and infinite;
and in the same way it is said of God that he is one.134
The fact that God’s essence is identical with his existence informs every other divine attribute,
including the unity of God. God is Perfect Being and therefore is Perfect Unity. The unity of God
follows upon his perfect being. “But [God] is supremely undivided inasmuch as he is divided neither
actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since he is altogether simple. … Hence it is manifest
that God is ‘one’ in the supreme degree [maxime unus].”135 This supreme unity of God is founded
precisely in his esse, his “existence” or his “to be.”136 God’s essence is identical with his esse and thus
we can say that God has one perfect and infinite esse, which is identical with his nature and with
himself. Aquinas states that “whatever is one in species and form in the Godhead cannot be multiplied
numerically.”137 God’s essence is his existence, one infinite esse, which cannot be multiplied even with
several distinct hypostases. Therefore, “the divine persons have one being [esse].”138 The absolute unity
of the Godhead is not negated by the several supposits, for the three are one in essence and, thus, even
in their very being.
Unity as Opposed to Plurality by Division
Transcendental unity is opposed to division as its privation. “Unity signifies absence of
division.”139 We saw above that this unity is convertible with being precisely as it is undivided. Aquinas
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states that plurality140 and number141 follow upon division, or at least distinction.142 In this way,
“plurality is opposed to unity”143 and “multitude proceeds from some unity.”144 Unity is the privation of
division, while multitude is a result of division. Therefore, unity is opposed to plurality by division.
“Plurality comes about only through withdrawal from unity. But something withdraws from unity only
through division, for something is said to be one from the fact that it is undivided.”145 Just as something
is one insofar as it is undivided, something can be labeled a multitude to the extent of its division.
“Something is called many from the fact that it is divisible or actually divided.”146 In relation to “one,”
plurality can be said to be a privation inasmuch as it lacks indivision, for it is always the case that “the
removal of unity is founded in some one thing.”147 The inverse—that unity is a privation of plurality—
is also true: “‘One’ is opposed to ‘many’ privatively, inasmuch as the idea of ‘many’ involves
division.”148 Unity is opposed to plurality and plurality is opposed to unity according to the presence or
absence of division.
Since we can only predicate transcendental unity to God, we also must be limited to predicating
its opposed plurality to him, that is, if we are even able to assert a true multitude of him at all. While it
is clear that we cannot attribute a numerical unity to God (nor thus a numerical multitude according to
measure) as he is absolutely infinite and immaterial, we are constrained, however, to predicate a real
plurality in the Godhead if we are to recognize three really distinct persons in the Trinity. Since,
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therefore, “all plurality is a consequence of division,”149 we must inquire into the way in which it can
be said that God is both absolutely one and somehow divided into three persons.150 Generally speaking,
division implies “separation into parts.”151 For this reason, Aquinas rejects predicating any division in
God. “But lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the terms ‘separation’
and ‘division,’ which belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided…”152 At the same time, Aquinas
grants that division can be understood in God, in a certain respect.
Division as Diversity, Difference, and Distinction
To understand how it is that there can be division in the Godhead, we must first inquire into the
different modes of division. Aquinas states, “For since division causes plurality and indivision unity, we
must judge of one and many according to the various kinds of division.”153 Fundamentally, division can
be understood in three ways: diversity, difference, and distinction. Since the essence is identically the
same for all three persons, there can be no diversity in God. “Diversity requires a distinct substance in
the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is another
[alius].”154 Further, strictly speaking, the Trinitarian persons are one in that there is no otherness or
difference between them. “‘Difference’ implies distinction of form. There is one form in God. …
Therefore the term ‘difference’ does not properly apply to God…”155 Clearly, then, there is neither
diversity nor difference in God according to their proper significations.156 Both such divisions are
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founded upon separation of the essence, partition, or even inequality among the persons.
Insofar as difference is taken relatively, however, and not absolutely,157 we can speak of division
in God according to distinction. Distinction is in this limited way “a sort of otherness between two
notions or things.”158 Armand Maurer notes that “Thomas finds the general term ‘distinction’ most
appropriate to express the otherness of persons in the Trinity.”159 The otherness in God is only
understood as distinction, not as a diversity or even difference in its proper sense, for it is not a
distinction of essence or being but arises only according to the relative opposition constitutive of the
three persons. Aquinas calls this distinction “in respect of a mere relation” the “distinction of the
slightest kind,”160 for “the more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity.”161 The persons
are distinct from each other, related by opposition to each other in an order of origin.162 “In immaterial
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substances there can be no distinction except that of order. But in the divine Persons who are entirely
immaterial there can be no other order than that of origin.”163 This order of natural origin in the divine
persons Aquinas calls the “order of nature.”164 It is in this sense that he says that there are two
principles of distinction in the Godhead, origin and relation, with the latter best capturing the intrinsic
form of each supposit.165 Thus, relation is distinctive of each person. Diversity and difference imply a
division of essence, whereas distinction in God is predicated solely on account of the order of relative
opposition.166
These relations in God do not import any composition in God since each is truly identical with
the divine essence.167 Relation is constitutive and distinctive of each person, such that the persons are
the subsisting relations themselves. The purely relative mode of distinction between the persons,
however, is a real distinction just as the relations themselves are real and subsistent. “…[T]hat which is
proper to a real relation, namely opposition and distinction, is really in God.”168 This real distinction
between the divine supposits is sometimes referred to as a “difference” between them on account of the
“quasi-form” that each possesses, namely their personal properties (paternity, filiation, and spiration)
but not on account of any difference of essence.169 “Though the same nature is in Father and Son, it is
in each by a different mode of existence [alium modum existendi], that is to say with a different
relation. Consequently that which belongs to the Father in respect of his nature does not of necessity
belong to the Son.”170 Aquinas refers to this distinction in mode of existence between the persons a
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“formal distinction” inasmuch as the relations are opposed to each other and therefore “constitute a
plurality of mutually distinct supposits, since plurality follows distinction: and formal distinction arises
from opposition.”171 This formal distinction between supposits is not, however, properly speaking an
otherness or a difference, though such terms are at times used to stress the distinction between them.172
This relative distinction, however, is a division in the Godhead, but according to the slightest
kind.173 Aquinas notes that this least possible distinction “cannot regard anything absolute” and thus
maintains the absolute unity of divine essence.174 Further, since the divine essence is identical with the
divine esse, the persons are not distinct in being. “Since plurality of units is caused by a distinction, if
this distinction be one of being [esse] the units must differ in being [esse]: but where the distinction is
one of relation, the units that compose the number must differ only relatively from one another.”175
Accordingly, Aquinas notes that “there is a kind of division which altogether transcends [i.e., is more
universal and comprehensive than] the genus of quantity, and this is division according to formal
opposition which has nothing to do with quantity.”176 The plurality in the Godhead, then, has nothing to
do with quantity or the unity that is in the genus of quantity. Instead, since “any kind of distinction
suffices to cause a plurality of like kind,”177 the relative distinction in the Godhead must imply a
relative plurality that transcends the genus of quantity and maintains the absolute unity of the divine
essence.
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Transcendental Multitude
Aquinas states quite generally that number is “multitude … measured by one.”178 While number
as a species of quantity has no place in God, he notes that there is also a number that corresponds to the
unity convertible with being. Strictly speaking, unity is opposed to division and subsequently to
multitude by division.179 The unity found in the Godhead, namely transcendental unity, is not directly
opposed to multitude, but to the division of essence and being. That multitude predicated of several
material creatures measures number according to discrete quantity. In immaterial things, however, there
is a “multitude that is opposed to the unity that is convertible with being: and this is caused by formal
division which is into opposite forms whether absolute or relative: and such is number in God.”180 The
relative quasi-forms of the personal properties that constitute the divine supposits also constitute a
multitude of unities.
The unity of God corresponds not only to the essence absolutely speaking, but also to each
person of the Trinity. “In God one is common to essence and relation: thus we say that the essence is
one, and that the Father is one.”181 The transcendental unity predicated of both essence and person
signifies the indivision of each.
So we when say, the essence is one, the term “one” signifies the essence undivided; and
when we say the person is one, it signifies the person undivided; and when we say the
persons are many, we signify those persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is
of the very nature of multitude that is should be composed of units.182
Each of the supposits, identical with the divine essence, is undivided in itself. Aquinas states that
“when we speak of many things, multitude in this [transcendent] sense points to those things as being
each undivided in itself.”183 Corresponding to the transcendental unity of God is a transcendental
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multitude wherein the multitude is established simply on the basis of many things that are undivided in
themselves and distinct from each other.
[T]he plurality that corresponds to this [transcendental] unity [convertible with being]
adds nothing to the many things except distinction, which consists in each one not being
the other: and this they have not from anything added to them but from their proper forms.
It is clear, then, that one which is convertible with being posits being but adds nothing
except the negation of division. And the number corresponding to it adds this to the things
described as many, that each of them is one, and that each of them is not the other, wherein
is the essence of distinction.184
Aquinas adds that this transcendental multitude only adds two negations: that each thing is undivided in
itself and that each thing is not the other. In other words, transcendental multitude does not positively
add anything to the several units of which it is predicated. Therefore, to predicate a transcendental
multitude in the Godhead does not introduce any composition in him. “Such a multitude is applicable
to God.”185 In this way, then, multitude does not remove unity from God, but solitude, for “if plurality
of persons did not exist in God, He would be alone [solus] or solitary.”186 Instead, the one God is an
eternal communion of three interrelated persons. This transcendental multitude seems to be what
Damascene has in mind when he says, “…yet the number does not introduce division. … And number
is not by nature a cause of division or union, but is, rather, a sign of the quantity of the things
numbered, whether they be united or divided.”187
The indivision relevant to transcendental multitude is the indivision of those singulars that—
collectively taken—constitute a multitude.188 Aquinas says as much: “Transcendental multitude does
not add anything to those things of which it is predicated except indivision regarding singulars.”189 The
divine persons are singular units as distinct supposita undivided in themselves and really distinct from
each other. Yet, they are united in essence and being. The relation of singular persons to the essential
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unity of the Godhead is reminiscent of the relationship between individuals of a species, that is, one of
many units collectively unified in what makes them all essentially the same kind of thing. The
individuals that are united in species, however, are not merely distinct according to relation (like the
divine persons), but are divided by a true diversity of being.190 As will be shown later, a species is a
logical unity that does not have any true unity in reality outside of the abstract essence of each real
being distinct in esse. The divine essence, however, is really identical with each person. As Douglas
Hall observes: “There is no way in which plurality in the Trinity can be based on divisibility of essence
or species.”191
Speaking broadly, Aquinas refers to the unity of the divine essence as a “numerical unity,” not
as the principle of measure found in material things but according to the singularity of being. In this
way, transcendental unity is sometimes referred to as a numerical unity precisely as it indicates the
unity of the unique existent supposit in contrast to that unity that categorizes a species. “A thing is said
to be the same identically [idem numero] according to suppositum, but the same specifically according
to form.”192 Aquinas goes on to call this sameness in number a numerical unity [unitas numeralis]. In
this way, numerical unity is also called numerical identity. The three persons of the Trinity, moreover,
are united and identical according to number as they are absolutely one in Godhead, essence, and
being. Therefore, their unity is not only one of species, but even of numerical identity.193
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CHAPTER SIX: SPEAKING ABOUT GOD AS A PLURALITY OF PERSONS
God is said to be both one in essence and being and also a multitude of three really distinct
persons. Despite there being a seeming contradiction to our human mode of understanding, Aquinas
asserts that there is absolutely no contradiction between God as One and God as Trinity. “A proposition
can be said to be unintelligible in two ways. In one way on the part of the knower who lacks
understanding. An example is the proposition: ‘In the three divine persons there is one essence.’”194
Just because there are two ways of speaking about God, that does not imply that God is twofold in
being.195 Rather, there are multiple modes of predication when speaking about God. “Real relations
must be the divine substance, yet they have not the mode of substance, but receive another mode of
predication differing from those things that are predicated of God substantively.”196 When we speak
about the one divine essence, we signify God according to his substance. On the other hand, when we
speak about the divine persons, we signify God according to his three hypostases. In both modes of
predication, God is signified, but according to different aspects, united in reality but distinct in our
understanding. Therefore, we must be carefully attentive regarding exactly what is signified, or, rather,
how terms applied to God signify him according to the mode of the essence or to the mode of the
supposits. “When we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must
be considered no less than the thing signified.”197
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“Trinity”
The word that tradition has handed down to speak about the three divine persons that are united
in essence is “Trinity.” Aquinas explains that this term can refer to both the three persons and the one
essence in which they are united.
In its etymological sense, this word “Trinity” seems to signify the one essence of the three
persons, according as trinity may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term
it rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account we cannot
say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three persons.198
Aquinas proceeds to note that according to the proper signification of the term, “Trinity” refers to the
three persons, not to the relations by which they are constituted. We can say that multitude in God
refers to both persons and relations, but the word “Trinity” signifies the three persons who are united in
essence. Regarding the beautiful Athanasian phrase, trinity in unity and unity in trinity, Aquinas
comments: “So when we say, ‘Trinity in Unity,’ we do not place number in the unity of the essence, as
if we meant three times one; but we place the persons numbered in the unity of nature. … On the other
hand, we say ‘Unity in Trinity’; meaning that the nature is in its supposita.”199 The relation of the unity
of essence to the Trinity of persons is always the most fundamental question in trinitarian theology, and
their confusion is at the root of the two most common trinitarian heresies.
Aquinas notes that the opposite heresies of Arianism and Sabellianism are founded upon the
same error of equating person and essence, where each signifies the other. “Now, in treating of the
Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously between them—namely, the
error of Arius, who placed a Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of Sabellius,
who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.”200 The mode of predication regarding the unity
and distinction of persons in God has real import. The distinction between signifying persons and

ST I 31.1 ad 1.
ST I 31.1 ad 4.
200
ST I 31.2.
198
199

44

essence is not a baseless logical abstraction, but has real significance for a proper understanding of the
realities of unity and plurality in God.

Absolute Predications Versus Relative Predications
As seen above, Aquinas clearly asserts that there is only one divine esse shared by each of the
three persons of the Trinity. As to whether there is only one res in God, however, he is a bit more
ambiguous. Certainly, God is only one res or thing; otherwise, there would be several gods. And, yet,
Aquinas states that “there are several realities subsistent [plures res subsistentes] in the divine nature,”
meaning of course the three subsistent relations.201 This warrants a distinction: in God, there is one res
absolutely but three res relatively speaking. “Hence we must reply [against a logical distinction of the
persons] that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three things [tres res], provided thing be taken for a
relative thing: for if it be taken as absolute, then they are but one thing.”202 Thus, there is both one thing
and three things in God, depending on the respective mode of signification.
Along these same lines, Aquinas asserts that “in God there are only two modes of predication,
namely substantive and relative,” and that all trinitarian discourse always employs these two modes in
an interconnected dialectic.203 Just as “the essence … is not spoken of relatively,”204 so too “nothing
that is said of God absolutely can be understood as distinguishing and constituting the hypostases in the
persons.”205 Aquinas elaborates on the nature of signification, and the mode it implies in reference to its
object.
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The essential attributes not only signify that which is the divine essence, but they also
signify it in a certain way, since they signify something as existing in God: and for this
reason a difference in respect of anything absolute would reflect on the divine essence.
On the other hand the divine relations, though they signify that which is the divine
essence, they do not signify it by way of essence, since they do not convey the idea of
existence in something, but of reference towards something else.206
Absolute predication signifies the divine essence “in a certain way,” namely as something existing in
God pertaining to the essence. Relative predication also signifies the divine essence, but not according
to something existing in the essence but relation ad aliud, and so only pertain to the personal supposits
of the divine essence.
The difference between absolute and relative predication is founded upon the logical distinction
between essence and person in God.207 “In God the absolute and the relative do not differ really, but
only logically…”208 Essence and person differ only logically and thus also in their mode of
signification. Absolute predication of God signifies his essence. Relative predication of God signifies
the persons insofar as the relations constitute the persons. Even though the word “person” is absolute in
its usual mode of signification, it signifies a relation in God, for the relations distinguish the persons in
the Godhead.209 Ultimately, then, the distinction is between the divine nature considered absolutely
versus the divine nature considered relatively as it is in the singular supposits according to the general
principle that “whatsoever belongs to the nature [as considered in one particular supposit] does not
necessarily belong to every supposit of that nature.”210 At the same time, Aquinas always stresses the
fundamental identity between the relations and the divine essence.211 Since we understand a logical

De pot. 8.2 ad 4.
See esp. ST I 39.1 ad 2: “As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be
denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.”
208
De pot. 7.1 ad 6. Cf. SCG IV, 14 (10): “…a relation in divinity is not without an absolute. But a comparison to an
absolute in God is other than a comparison to an absolute in created things. For in created things a relation is compared to
an absolute as an accident to a subject; not in God, of course—there the comparison is by way of identity, just as it is also in
other things which are said of God.”
209
See De pot. 9.6 ad 2. Cf. ad 4: “The form signified by the word person is not the essence taken absolutely, but is that
which is the principle of incommunicability or individuation.”
210
De pot. 9.9 ad 2.
211
Cf. SCG IV, 14 (10): “…a relation in divinity is not without an absolute. But a comparison to an absolute in God is other
than a comparison to an absolute in created things. For in created things a relation is compared to an absolute as an accident
206
207

46

distinction between them, however, such a distinction in thought demands a distinction in predication
as human language is always founded upon human understanding.
Moreover, there is a real distinction in God, but only at the relative level and not absolutely.212
“The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in
God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute—namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity
and simplicity—but according to that which is relative.”213 But as we noted above regarding the
plurality of God, this relative distinction distinguishes the persons without introducing any kind of
essential division in the Godhead. “Now opposite relations in God meet together in the one same
absolute and do not divide it.”214 Founded upon this real distinction of supposits, plurality in God is
present only at the relative level, and not in regards to anything absolute.215 “The supreme unity and
simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations.”216
Distinction and plurality in God are not at the absolute level, but only in regards to what is signified in
God relatively. There is no distinction in God regarding the divine essence or esse.
If it were a distinction in esse, as is necessary in a relation of particulars to a universal or of
individuals to a species,217 the plurality in God would be at the absolute level, since God’s essence is
his existence (esse). But Aquinas reminds us: “The divine persons are not distinguished as regards
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being [esse], in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative.”218
The distinction according to relation does not demand a distinction of esse in each singular unity.219
Aquinas notes that relative predication pertains to the distinction of divine supposits, which unlike
creatures, do not have their own unique esse, but are united in esse and the one essence of the Godhead.
The relationship of individuals of a species, taking into account the diverse esse among them, cannot be
applied to God, whose one essence is identical with his one esse.220
Singular and Plural Terms
Closely following the distinction between absolute and relative predication in God is the
distinction between singular and plural terms in reference to God. The latter distinction is a logical
extension of that between absolute and relative signification. Singular terms are used absolutely and
refer to the unity of essence, while plural terms connote relations. Whereas singular terms are also
called essential terms,221 the plural terms are also known as notional terms in regards to the notions that
distinguish the persons.222 “Unity and number are both attributed to God but not in the same respect:
unity in respect of the essence, number in respect of the persons: or unity in respect of absolutes,
number in respect of relations.”223 As observed above, plurality in God is at the relative level, and not
in regard to anything absolute. Yet, what is plural in God (the persons) is still identified with what is
singular (the essence), but we distinguish them according to their mutual modes of predication, as to
what is signified as an absolute unity and what is signified as a multitude of relations.224
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Although “whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every person per
se, and of all the persons together,”225 Aquinas notes that because of “the unity of essence,” “an
essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost.”226 This means that
while a singular absolute term can be used particularly of a singular person, it cannot strictly speaking
be used plurally, such that there would be three essences or three esse in God. Because of this, an
analogy of species and individual could not be unconditionally applied to God, since a plurality of
individuals in a species implies a plurality of essence and esse. Only transcendentals like “unity” and
res can be predicated either singly or plurally of God referring either to his essence or the constitutive
relations.227
Concrete and Abstract Names
The final distinction incumbent upon the mode of signification proper to God is between
concrete and abstract names. Aquinas explains this final distinction:
We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from
which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to
signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite;
and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or
life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect
understands, but not that there is any composition in God.228
The concrete nouns signify God according to his subsistence. The abstract nouns, on the other hand,
signify God in reference to the simplicity of his essence. Aquinas notes that just as our knowledge of
God is drawn from our knowledge of his effects, so, too our vocabulary about God is derived from how
we speak about creatures.
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[A]ll names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete
meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms,
signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness
signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute
to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His
substance and perfection, although both of these kinds of names fail to express His mode
of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.229
Every mode of predication about God will always be imperfect, as our knowledge of him is indirect
and limited by our finite minds. To the extent that we can know God in this life, we must accordingly
signify him as abstract or concrete.
Aquinas reminds us, as in the other forms of signification, that the abstract and concrete in God
do not actually differ in reality. “For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and
form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as ‘Godhead’ and ‘God.’”230
Instead, we find one more variation on the ways in which we signify God insofar as we find a logical
distinction in him. “In God the abstract and the concrete do not differ in reality, since in God there is
neither accident nor matter: they differ only in the manner of signification, inasmuch as we understand
the Godhead as constituting God and God as having Godhead: the same applies to Paternity and the
Father, for though they are really the same thing, they differ in their mode of signification.”231 As noted
in this quotation, abstract names do not directly signify God as subsisting, but God in the abstract, such
as we would discuss the divinity, or as he is pure being, wisdom, goodness, etc. If we are to speak
about God as we would an abstracted form, then we use an abstract name. On the other hand, concrete
names signify the subsistence of God as he is this thing. Aquinas notes that the “concrete essential
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names … signify the supposit in general: for instance, God is the one who has Godhead.”232 It is
important to stress that the distinction between abstract and concrete names is not directly parallel to
those of relative and absolute predication or singular and plural terms.
Unlike the previous pairs of modes of signification discussed above, the distinction between
abstract and concrete names does not immediately follow upon the distinction between essence and
person in God. Instead, it follows upon the distinction between form and subsistent whole, as well as
upon the nature of “abstraction of the form from the matter.”233 The concrete mode of signification can
stand for either the subsistent essence, generally speaking, or a divine person or persons.
[T]his word ‘God,’ from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person,
as does the word ‘man.’ So this word ‘God’ sometimes stands for the essence, as when we
say ‘God creates’; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form
signified—that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one,
as when we say, ‘God begets,’ or for two, as when we say, ‘God spirates,’ or for three…234
In fact, the distinction between concrete and abstract names can be applied not only to the divine
supposit in general and the divinity in the abstract, but also to each of the divine persons and the
constitutive personal quasi-forms which relatively distinguish them from each other. “We must say that
there are properties in God. These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the
persons. So, since the nature of a form requires it to be ‘in’ that of which it is the form, we must say
that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in
God, and yet is God.”235 Aquinas reaffirms that the distinctive personal properties and the persons
themselves are identical, since the abstract and concrete do not differ in reality. “For personal properties
are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are
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the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and
procession is the Holy Ghost.”236 The divine persons and the subsisting divine essence, therefore, are
not related according to the relationship of the concrete and the abstract.
Aquinas notes that there are “two kinds of abstraction: the abstraction of the general from the
particular, and the abstraction of the form from the matter.”237 The relation of species and individual is
founded upon the former, while abstract and concrete names are derived from the latter abstraction, as
noted above. When we speak of abstraction and God, therefore, we do not attribute to him a
composition of the general and the particular, but a logical distinction between his subsistence and his
simplicity. In regards to our present question, then, this distinction has no absolute or direct importance,
since the abstraction we are most concerned with is of the general or universal from the particular as it
is found in the relation of individuals to a species.
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Part III: The Relation of Individuals to a Species
CHAPTER SEVEN: GENUS, SPECIES, AND INDIVIDUAL
Genus, species, and individual are categories used to indicate how several things can be united
while yet really diverse in being. Aquinas observes that the categories of genus and species are founded
upon what is essentially common among beings having the same nature. “Essence must mean
something common to all the natures through which different beings are placed in different genera and
species, as for example humanity is the essence of man, and so with regard to other things.”238 Insofar
as it is understood as common to many, the essence is universal.239 Several individuals are united in
species according to their sameness of nature. If they are united by identity of nature, they are said to
constitute a species. In the same way, inasmuch as different species are identical in some more
universally essential way, they are said to be one in genus. The categories of genus and species, then,
capture what is universal and common to several individual things. “[T]he many that are contained
under one universal, as man and horse under animal, for the name ‘animal’ signifies both, [are
understood] not as they are many and different from each other but as they are united in the nature of
the genus.”240 As the essence of things is known in the mind, the essence is understood in terms of what
is specifically universal (species) and what is more broadly universal (genus). From a determination of
the genus by a specific difference, we know the species and also the definition of the essence.241

Relations of the Determined and the Undetermined
Just as what is universal in the species is distinguished in its respective individuals, so also in a
similar manner is what is universal in the genus determined in a particular way in its respective species.
The genus is specifically determined in each species, and the species is particularly determined in each
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individual. “[T]hat which comes under a common denomination is related to the common name as the
determinate to the indeterminate…”242 For Aquinas, the categories of genus and species and individual
are said to differ from each other according to relations of what is “designated” and what is
“undesignated.”243
The essence of the genus and the essence of the species [like species and individual] also
differ as designated and undesignated, though the mode of designation is different in the
two cases. The individual is designated with respect to its species through matter
determined by dimensions, whereas species is designated with respect to the genus
through the constitutive difference, which is derived from the form of the thing. This
determination or designation which is in a species with regard to its genus is not caused
by something existing in the essence of the species and in no way in the essence of the
genus; rather, whatever is in the species is also in the genus but in an undetermined way.
If indeed “animal” were not wholly what “man” is, but only a part of him, “animal” could
not be predicated of “man”, since no integral part may be predicated of its whole.244
The essence of the species, as Aquinas says, is a perfection “implicitly contained in”245 and, in a sense,
derived from the essence of the genus. As a determination of the genus, the species fully possesses that
perfection belonging to the genus, and “everything in the species is included indeterminately in the
genus.”246 Not everything indeterminate in the genus, however, is contained in the species, for thus
they would be completely identical. Instead, the species is a “subjective part” of the genus, meaning
that it is one specific determination of the genus according to its constitutive difference, a
determination that does not fully exhaust the potential determinations of the genus into other different
species. “It does happen that something having one perfection may also possess a further perfection, as

De pot. 9.4: “…man is included directly in the idea of animal as the determinate in the indeterminate… And since that
which comes under a common denomination is related to the common name as the determinate to the indeterminate, that
which was included becomes the thing signified by the addition of a determining word to the common term: thus a rational
animal is a man.”
243
Cf. Armand Maurer, On being and essence, 37 no. 11: “A thing is said to be designated (designatum, signatum) when it
can be shown or pointed to with the finger. This is true of the individual thing but not of the abstract nature or essence. The
latter can be defined; the former cannot be defined but it can only be pointed to. … The undesignated is the undetermined ...
undifferentiated.”
244
De ente II, 5.
245
De ente II, 7: “In this way the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, inasmuch as body is its genus.
And such also is the relation of animal to man.”
246
Stephen Hipp, e-mail message to author, December 16, 2015. Cf. De ente II, 8: “The genus signifies indeterminately
everything in the species…”
242

54

is evident in man, who has a sensitive nature and, besides this, an intellectual nature.”247 The species, as
a determination of the genus, is an additional perfection beyond what is determinately expressed by the
genus, and yet implicit and simply in potency in the genus.248 Similarly, species and its corresponding
individuals also differ according to relations of what is undetermined and determined, respectively.
“The difference between the essence of Socrates and the essence of man lies solely in what is
designated and not designated.”249 Aquinas notes that this individuation of the species into several
singulars is always on account of matter. Still, the same relation holds between species and individual
as between genus and species such that, as a subjective part, the individual fully possesses the
perfection of the species in a determinate and singular way, but in no way exhausts the fullness of
further potential determinations of the relatively indeterminate species.
The unity of the genus and the species depend precisely upon their relative indetermination with
respect to subordinate species or individuals, respectively. The addition of a specific difference to the
genus or the instantiation of the specific form in singular matter removes the unity of each such that
there are now multiple species identical in genus or multiple individuals identical in species.
The unity of the genus comes from its indetermination or indifference, but not in such a
way that what is signified by the genus is a nature numerically the same in different
species, to which would be added something else (the difference) determining it as a form
determines a matter that is numerically one. Rather, the genus denotes a form (though not
precisely any one in particular) which the difference expresses in a definite way, and
which is the same as that which the genus denotes indeterminately. … It is clear, therefore,
that when the indetermination which caused the unity of the genus is removed by the
addition of the difference, there remain species different in essence.250
De ente II, 6.
Genus, by the addition of the specific difference, becomes determined to a species. In material beings, the species
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The unity of God, however, is beyond that of a generic unity or specific unity. The divine persons are
not merely united in the indetermination of a divine species. In the Godhead, we cannot speak of
relations of something indeterminate to something determinate. Although in relation to the other
supposits, the Father is determined by his personal property of Paternity, the Paternity is not a
determination of the divine essence. Instead, each personal property is really identical with the essence
of God. The Paternity is the divinity, and likewise for the properties of the Son and Holy Spirit. The
divine persons are not in relation to the essence as the more determined to the less determined, as is the
case between species and a genus, or even individuals to a species. If the divine persons were
determinations of an indeterminate divine essence, then there would be some perfection determinately
present in each person in a way unlike its indeterminate presence in the essence, thus negating the
identity of person and essence in God, in contradiction to his perfect simplicity.251 More will be said in
this regard below.

The Multiplication of Individuals in a Species
Within a species we find numerous individuals such as several donkeys or several tulips. What
accounts for the many distinct individuals of the same nature and in the same species? Aquinas
explains that since “everything [composed of matter and form] is individuated by matter and located in
a genus or species through its form,”252 material creatures are multiplied in their respective species on
account of a multiplicity of matter. Maurer observes, “St. Thomas always maintained that matter and its
quantitative dimensions account for the existence of many individuals in the same species.”253 Aquinas
notes that something can be multiplied in three ways. The first form of multiplication is through the
addition of a difference, like in the way a genus becomes several species. The third regards the
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distinction between a separate form and a form received in something, such as a hypothetical Platonic
form. The second mode of multiplication he lists, however, is “by the reception of a form in different
parts of matter (as a specific nature is multiplied in different individuals).”254 The relationship of
several individuals to one species thus only concerns material creatures since matter alone can multiply
a single species into several subjective supposits of that species.
In immaterial beings (i.e., intelligences or angels), on the other hand, the species is a form
individuated of itself. “But since the essence of a simple entity is not received in matter, it cannot be
multiplied in this way. That is why in these [separate] substances we cannot find many individuals in
the same species; there are as many species among them as there are individuals.”255 Aquinas says that
the reason why separate (immaterial) substances “are not limited from below”—that is, from matter—
such that they multiply individuals in the same species is “because their forms are not limited to the
capacity of a matter that receives them.”256 This does not mean, however, that the categories of genus
and species do not apply to them. No, instead, the real distinction of esse and essence of all creatures
allows for such categorization, but it is different for the angels than for material creatures.
“Furthermore, because the quiddity of these substances is not identical with their being, they can be
classified in a category. For this reason they have a genus, species, and difference, though their specific
differences are hidden from us.”257 The categories of genus and species apply to the angels, such that
each angel is its own species. There are as many species as there are individual angels. The forms of
the separate substances are individuated of themselves, for they are limited from above by the reception
of esse within the limitations of their essences. Substances composed of matter and form, however, “are
limited both from above and below” such that they too do not have identical esse and essence, but they
are also limited in the “division of designated matter,” which allows not only for the categories of
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genus and species, but the multiplication of individuals in the species.258 The trinitarian persons,
contrary to both angelic and material substances, are limited in relation to the divine nature neither by
the distinction of esse and essence nor by the division of matter. In sum, on this account the categories
of genus and species can only be improperly applied to the Godhead.

Individuation
Properly speaking, the individual cannot be defined, as it transcends the order of essence and no
universal idea of individuality can be formed.259 Aquinas does, however, offer some indications of
what is meant by the “individual.” First he says that to refer to a thing as an individual indicates a
certain “individual mode of existence” pertaining to that thing.260 Further, Aquinas states that
“individual, being a negation, does not imply composition through being added to a substance.”261 By
this he means that “individual” indicates a mode of existence as not being predicated of another and
thus self-subsistent. In other words, “the term ‘individual’ … signif[ies] the mode of subsistence which
belongs to particular substances.”262 Finally, since an individual is a subsistent, particular substance, it
constitutes a distinct unity. “The individual in itself is undivided [indistinctum], but is distinct from
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others.”263 Aquinas shows us that the individual is a distinct unit, self-subsistent in its mode of
existence and not predicated of another.
A distinction is required, however, between individuality in the strict sense and in a wide sense.
Strictly speaking, the individual typically refers to the division of the species into its logical inferiors,
as when we say that several individuals are united in species. This first type of individuation H. D.
Gardeil calls logical and says that it refers to the “ultimate subject” that is “in no way predicable.”264
The wide sense of “individual” Gardeil calls metaphysical “in the sense of supposit” which refers to a
“being as endowed with its own incommunicable subsistence.”265 Individuality in this latter sense
refers to the numerical unity and distinctive existence of a real being. According to the first sense, a
being is individuated according to the composition of form and matter, with the matter individuating
the common form. In the second sense, individuation simply signifies subsistence and does not
necessarily imply a composition of matter and form.

Individuality and God
In reference to God, individuality in the strict sense cannot be predicated of God, but only in the
wide sense. “God cannot be called an ‘individual’ in the sense that his individuality comes from matter;
but only in the sense which implies incommunicability.”266 God is pure spirit, a self-subsistent form,
with absolutely no composition in him. Aquinas refers to God, who is pure form, as a form
individualized of himself.267 “[I]n things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization
is not due to individual matter—the very forms being individualized of themselves—it is necessary
[that] the forms themselves should be subsisting supposita. Therefore suppositum and nature in them
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are identified.”268 He goes on to say that God is such a form, and further, that God is his own supposit,
essence, and esse. God is an individual in the metaphysical sense that the divine form is individualized
of itself, such that God is self-subsistent esse, transcendently distinct from all creatures.
Aquinas elaborates on this distinction between metaphysical and logical individuation, and their
respective applicability to God.
In created things the principles of individuality exercise two functions. The one is that
they are the principle of subsistence (since the common nature does not subsist by itself
except in the individual): and the other is that they distinguish the supposits of the
common nature from one another. But in God the personal properties only distinguish the
supposits of the divine nature from one another, while they are not the principles of
subsistence of the divine essence (since the divine essence is subsistent in itself) but on
the contrary subsist by the essence… And hence it follows likewise that the divine essence
is not numerically multiplied by reason of the multiplicity of its supposits, as happens
here below. Because a thing is multiplied on account of that which gives it subsistence:
and although the divine essence is so to speak individualized by itself as regards its selfsubsistence, yet though it is itself one in number there are several supposits in God
mutually distinct by subsistent relations.269
In other words, the personal properties—which distinguish the persons into a multitude—do not cause
God to be subsistent, but rather the divine essence is a form individualized of itself. The persons are
subsistent because they are identified with the self-subsistent divine essence, and not the other way
around. Therefore, the divine essence, individualized of itself, remains fundamentally one despite a
plurality of supposits. The persons, which are not principles of individuation in respect to the common
nature, cannot be called logical individuals of a common species, but only metaphysically as they are
subsistent supposits of the self-subsistent divine essence. For the trinitarian persons to be logical
individuals of a species would imply that they are diverse in esse270 in order for them to be understood
as common in essence. If they are one in esse, however—which they are—they are also numerically
identical with the divine nature, and not logical individuals that imply individuation with respect to a
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common essence. Metaphysical individuality—tellingly referred to as individuality in the wide sense—
does not imply such a relationship of diverse individuals to a species but simply signifies subsistence
(regardless of the principle), a predication no Catholic theologian denies of the trinitarian persons. This
distinction between metaphysical and logical individuality, however, does not exhaust the reasons that
Aquinas gives against predicating the genus/species/individual relationship of the Godhead.

God Transcends Every Genus
Aquinas vehemently argues that God—whose essence is his existence—cannot be contained
within a genus, neither as a species nor as a principle. “A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either
absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles
and privations.”271 Something is in a genus absolutely and properly speaking as a subordinate species,
like man is in the genus of animal. In this way, God “cannot be a species of any genus,” for three
reasons. If God were a species within a wider genus, it would imply a relationship of matter and form
or at least potency and act, for a species is constituted of genus and difference.272 Further, if God were a
species, the divinity would be in the genus of being [ens], for it is impossible for esse to be a genus.
Finally, “in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity must differ,” such that genus regards the
essence of the thing and not the esse pertaining to each member. The esse or existence of an individual
thing cannot be universalized or placed in a universal category. As God is Being itself [ipsum esse], he
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therefore cannot be contained in a genus.273 In the same way, then, God cannot be defined, for a
definition, in articulating the specific essence, is made up of genus and specific difference.274
Moreover, Aquinas shows that God cannot be reducible to a genus as its principle. “That God is
not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any
genus does not extend beyond that genus… But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not
contained in any genus as its principle.”275 If God were contained within a genus (or even every genus)
as its principle, he would be limited to whatever that genus contains. Instead, his infinite being and
power are manifest in the fact that he is the principle of every being and thus beyond every genus.
“God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different ‘genus,’ but as transcending every
‘genus,’ and as the principle of all ‘genera.’”276 God transcends even the categories of the universals.
Aquinas offers an additional argument against God being contained within a genus in his
Summa contra gentiles, especially pertinent for our current question.
Whatever is in a genus differs in being [esse] from the other things in that genus;
otherwise, the genus would not be predicated of many things. But all the things that are
in the same genus must agree in the quiddity of the genus, since the genus is predicated
of all things in it in terms of what they are. In other words, the being [esse] of each thing
found in a genus is outside the quiddity of the genus. This is impossible in God. God,
therefore, is not in a genus.277
In other words, since God’s essence is his existence [esse], he cannot be in a genus, for to be in a genus
requires a real distinction between the universal quiddity of the genus and the respective esse of each
thing that is found within the genus. Furthermore, if God is not contained within a genus, but rather
transcends all genera as infinite principle of being, then neither is the divinity itself a genus. That is, if
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the three persons of the one God were three species within the one genus of divinity, differences
regarding their essence or form would engender specific differences between them. Likewise, if they
were individuals united in a divine genus, each person would possess his own distinct esse and
therefore each would be really distinct from the common divine essence. But since God is his essence,
none of the persons—on account of their diversity of essence or esse—could be God. This obviously
does not follow, for God cannot be a different species for each divine supposit nor can there be
multiple divine esse. Instead, the truth is that each person of the Trinity shares perfectly the one divine
esse in the unity of a singular essence such that they are individually and collectively the one true and
perfect God.

The Divine Species?
Presently, we proceed into the very heart of our initial question, namely, whether there is in God
something like species and individual. Simply stated, Aquinas answers in the negative: “God is neither
a species nor an individual.”278 At times, Aquinas does, however, speak about the divine essence as if it
were a species, like when he says that “nothing that is one in species can be more than one except by
reason of matter: for which reason there can be but one essence in God, because the divine essence is
utterly immaterial.”279 His position on this question is obviously nuanced. Strictly speaking, there is no
species in God, but we can speak of the divine essence as if it were a species, but of course in a
metaphorical sense. His allowance for this metaphorical language is not simply a privilege he grants to
the Fathers, but Aquinas himself even speaks this way. “One also finds in other things a likeness of the
divine Trinity, so far as anything in its substance is one, formed in a kind of species, ordered in some
fashion.”280 If we recall Lombard’s earlier treatment on this topic, we will remember that he too
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granted a metaphorical similitude between the divine essence and a species predicated of individuals,
but with the stress on the Augustinian tradition which rejects such an analogy.
Aquinas usually follows suit in this Augustinian tradition and stresses that, strictly speaking, we
cannot speak about God as a species and individuals. “God cannot be, as it were, a single species
predicated of many individuals. Various individuals that come together in one essence of a species are
distinguished by certain notes that lie outside the essence of the species. … This cannot occur in God,
for God Himself is His essence…”281 Aquinas even goes as far as to say that those individuating notes
outside the essence are material in origin, for genus and species are categories used of material
creatures. “The very essences or quiddities of genera and species are individuated through the
designated matter of this or that individual… But the divine essence exists through itself as a singular
existent and individuated through itself, for … it is not in any matter. The divine essence is predicated
of God, therefore, so that we may say: God is His essence.”282 His typical reasoning for why God
cannot be a species is the identity of the divine essence with the divine esse, or at least with the divine
supposit in general. The individuals of a species are identical in essence, but not in esse. “A number of
individuals comprised under one species differ in their existence [esse], and yet are alike in their one
essence. Accordingly, whenever a number of individuals are under one species, their existence [esse]
must be different from the essence of the species. But in God existence [esse] and essence are
identical… Therefore God cannot be a sort of species predicated of many individuals.”283 As observed
above in the section on unity and plurality, the multitude of individuals united in a species is caused by
a diversity of esse, whereas in the Godhead the division is only one of relative distinction. Therefore,
the unity of the species among natural substances is merely logical and not a real unity of being.
Aquinas calls this unity accidental and the division of individuals absolute. “[I]f [something] be
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undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or
in principle or cause, it will be ‘many’ absolutely and ‘one’ accidentally; as what are ‘many’ in number
and ‘one’ in species...”284 In other words, if the divine essence is a species, God’s unity of essence—
that is, the unity among the three persons—would simply be accidental and not absolute. Instead, the
plurality of persons would be absolute, each with his own diverse esse. If we say that three persons of
the Trinity are individuals of the species that is the divine essence, then we are predicating three gods
that are only united logically or accidentally. This is exactly what Augustine affirms and why Lombard
follows him so closely.
On a few occasions, Aquinas explicitly responds directly to Damascene’s analogy of the divine
species and trinitarian individuals. An objection in the Summa theologiae cites the authority of
Damascene on this topic in order to assert that “the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this
name ‘God,’ except in an accidental sense,” since “this name ‘God’ as regards the three persons is as a
general term to inferior terms.” Individuals are only predicated of a species accidentally, “for it is
accidental to animal to be man.”285 In his response to this objection, Aquinas rejects both the
conclusion of accidental predication as well as the reasoning that there is a divine species. “When we
say, ‘God,’ or ‘the divine essence is the Father,’ the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower
in regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this
proposition, ‘The Father is God’ is of itself true, so this proposition ‘God is the Father’ is true of itself,
and by no means accidentally.”286 Because of the predication of identity between each person and the
divine essence (or even the divine supposit in general), it is clear that a relationship between a species
and individuals cannot apply to God, for individuals cannot be predicated of their species except
accidentally.

ST I 11.1 ad 2. Cf. Armand Maurer, “Introduction,” xxxiii. Maurer notes that the relation of individuals to species implies
a numerical diversity, and that is the reason why such categories are problematic for the Trinity.
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In his second commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, known as the Lectura Romana, Aquinas
directly responds to Damascene’s position twice. In the first instance, Aquinas allows for the similitude
that Lombard grants to Damascene’s analogy. While the objection—based on Damascene’s language—
claims that “this name, ‘God’ is predicated of three persons in the plural” such that “the Father and the
Son and the Holy Spirit are three gods,”287 his reply notes both the similarity and dissimilarity of the
multitude in the Godhead to a multitude united according to species.
To the first, therefore, it is said that the saying of Damascene is similar according to the
distinction of persons in one nature, because just as these three men are distinguished in
human nature, so also three persons are distinguished in the divine nature. But it is
dissimilar because in men nature is not numerically one except according to species; for
numerically distinct are the humanities of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. However, to the
divine persons in common is numerically one nature, which is the absolutely simple and
maximally one divine nature.288
The objection plays right into Augustine’s principal reason for rejecting predicating a species of the
divine essence. Aquinas navigates well, however, the way in which, according to our human mode of
understanding, we can see something akin to a multitude of individuals in the Godhead. His response
offers further explanation as to the rejection of the species/individual analogy. While there is specific
unity among the individuals of the same nature, there is a greater unity found among the three persons
of the Trinity (in fact, the greatest unity). The divine persons are numerically united in essence. There is
really one essence in common secundum rem; individuals of a species have three distinct essences that
are logically united and not numerically one.

Lectura Romana 2.3.2, obj. 1: “It seems that this name, ‘God,’ is predicated of three persons in the plural. For
Damascene says that this name, ‘God,’ is common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, just as ‘man’ is common to
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But these are three men. Therefore, also the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three
gods.” My translation. “Videtur quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ praedicetur de tribus personis in plurali. Damascenus enim dicit
quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ ita est commune Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto, sicut ‘homo’ est commune Abrahae, Ysaac, et
Iacob. Sed isti sunt tres homines. Ergo et Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres dii.”
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Lectura Romana 2.3.2 ad 1. My translation. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Damasceni est simile quantum ad
distinctionem personarum in una natura, quia sicut isti tres homines distinguuntur in natura humana, ita et tres personae
distinguuntur in natura divina. Sed est dissimile quia in hominibus natura non est una numero sed tantum specie; alia enim
numero est humanitas Abrahae, Ysaac et Iacob. Personis vero divinis est una natura numero communis quae est natura
divina simplicissima et maxime una.” Cf. ST I 31.1 ad 4: “…we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as the
supposita of a nature are said to exist in that nature.”
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In his second interaction with Damascene in the Lectura Romana, Aquinas considers “whether
this [saying] is true, ‘God is Trinity’ or ‘God is three persons.’”289 Immediately, he cites in the first
objection the authority of Damascene, who “says that this name, ‘God,’ is common to three persons,
namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, just as this name, ‘man,’ is common to Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob.”290 His answer is brief, for it puts to use the same explanation in the section cited just above.
“To the first it is said that it is not similar—to the extent that something is similar—because in God
divinity is numerically the same in three persons, and God is his own essence; in men, however,
humanity is not numerically the same, nor is a man his own humanity.”291 While it essentially repeats
the same reasoning as his previous reply, here Aquinas uses what seems to be clearer language.
Humanity is not numerically identical in several human persons, but divinity is numerically identical in
the three divine persons.292 He adds that “God is his own essence,” which shows in one way what he
means in his usual reasoning against Damascene’s analogy, namely that the identity of supposit,
essence, and esse in God preclude an application of the species/individual relationship.293

CHAPTER EIGHT: UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY
The relationship of individuals to a species is one of particulars to a universal. Therefore,
incumbent upon the examination of that former relationship is the analysis of the logical relationship
Lectura Romana 4.2. My translation. “Quaeritur utrum haec sit vera, ‘Deus est Trinitas’ vel ‘Deus est tres personae.’”
Lectura Romana 4.2, obj. 1. My translation. “Et videtur quod non. Damascenus enim dicit quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ est
commune tribus personis, scilicet Patri, Filio et Spiritui Sancto, sicut hoc nomen ‘homo’ est commune Abrahae, Ysaac et
Iacob, etc.”
291
Lectura Romana 4.2 ad 1. My translation. “Ad primum dicendum quod non est simile – quantum ad aliquid est simile –
quia in Deo est eadem numero divinitas in tribus personis, et Deus est sua essentia; in hominibus vero non est eadem
numero humanitas, nec homo est sua humanitas.”
292
Cf. Wawrykow, 107: “First, as to nature, there is no potential in God; thus, one must guard against imagining, in referring
to the divine persons and divine nature, of an actualizing of the nature, or of a person coming to be who realizes a potential
for the divine form of life. … Along the same lines, there is no difference between a divine person and the divine nature.
The divine persons are identical with the nature, and eternally and perfectly so. While it is helpful to distinguish between
identity in species and identity in number when talking of human nature, the distinction is lacking when it comes to God.”
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Cf. Super Boethii De Trinitate 4.1: “Things that are diverse in genus, species or number … ha[ve] to do only with
composite beings, for everything in a genus must be composed of a genus and a difference.”
289
290

67

between particulars and the universal of which they participate. Particularity and universality are the
properties that characterize individuals of a species. Aquinas describes universality and particularity
with reference to a species as follows:
In any singular thing, we can consider what is proper to the thing insofar as it is this thing,
for instance, what is proper to Socrates or to Plato insofar as he is this man. We can also
consider that in which it agrees with certain other things, as, that Socrates is an animal, or
man, or rational, or risible, or white. Accordingly, when a thing is denominated from what
belongs only to this thing insofar as it is this thing, the name is said to signify a singular.
When a thing is denominated from what is common to it and to many others, the name is
said to signify a universal since it signifies a nature or some disposition which is common
to many.294
When singulars are spoken of according to what is common among them, a universal is indicated.
“What is abstracted from the concrete things is called universal.”295 Singulars do not necessarily need
to be instantiations of a universal, but if they are, they are known as particulars. Conversely, universals
do not, in fact, need to be predicated of several particulars, but simply need to be capable of such
predication.296 Thus, to be universal is to be capable of predication of several according to some
common perfection, whereas to be particular is to be a singular thing, a singular realization of the
universal predicated of it.
The universal is integrally related to its particulars such that the latter serve as the singular
instantiations of the former, the existence of which is common to many. Aquinas says that “the
universal nature is individuated in the singular.”297 But because the universal is a logical abstraction of
what is common to particulars, no real universal can exist that is not really instantiated particularly in
singular beings. Accordingly, then, “the universal can be considered either in abstraction from singulars
or as it is in singulars.”298 In this way, we can also say that the individuals are particular instantiations

Peri Hermeneias I 10.4.
ST I 86.1.
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of the universal species, and that we know that species first as it exists in its individual subjects, but
also as logically abstracted from individuals. The relationship between species and individuals, then, is
categorized along the lines of what is common to each individual as a universal and what is proper to
each individual as a particular.

No Universal and Particular in God
Just as frankly as he denies genus, species, and individual of him, Aquinas also rejects
universality and particularity of God. “In God, there [is not] universal and particular.”299 Moreover,
“God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular.”300 The root principle for this rejection,
noted above in regard to individuals of a species, lies in the fact that the particulars of a universal are
diverse in being (esse) from each other. “In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is
predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are one in essence and being [unum
secundum essentiam et esse], which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are
distinguished in being [secundum esse]. Person likewise is not a universal term in God...”301 In regard
to our present question, neither can we say that God’s essence is a universal, since each persons is the
same in esse and identical to the divine essence.

Participation
Beyond the division of esse, however, Aquinas also notes another principle at work in the
relation of particulars to a universal. Simply speaking, that principle is that the particulars of a universal
are considered “subjective parts” of the universal whole insofar as they are subjects in which the
universal reality is instantiated. The particular subject is just one of any number of subjects in which
the universal can be realized diversely, and, therefore, a part of the universal whole or of which the

Comp. I 62.
ST I 13.9 ad 2. Cf. 30.4 obj. 3.
301
ST I 42.4 ad 3.
299
300

69

whole is predicable.302 The particulars, then, are said to participate in the universal whole. “To
participate is, as it were, to take a part [of something]. And therefore, when something receives
particularly that which belongs to another universally, the former is said to participate in the latter.”303
To participate is to receive in a particular fashion what pertains universally to the whole. The Thomist
philosopher John Wippel calls this kind of participation logical: “In these cases a less extended
intelligible content is said to participate in a more extended intelligible content either as a species in a
genus or as an individual in a species. Because intelligible contents (rationes) are at issue, this kind of
participation may be described as ‘logical.’”304 Because it is fundamentally a relationship of
universality and particularity, the “individual [is placed] under the species by way of participation.”305
Individual participates in species because the individual does not possess the intelligible structure of
that in which it participates according to its full universality. No individual exhausts its essential
species, lest there be an identity of one individual and its essence, and therefore no universal species.

No Participation in God
On several accounts, then, the logical participation of species and individual cannot be
predicated of the Godhead. This is, first of all, because of the implication of diverse esse of particulars,
I am indebted to the explanation of my thesis advisor, Dr. Stephen Hipp, on this point.
In Boethii De heb. 2. As quoted in John F. Wippel, “Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed.
Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University, 1993), 85-127, at 93 and John F. Wippel, The
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, DC: Catholic University of
America, 2000), 96-131, at 96. Cf. ST I 3.8: “…that which participates is posterior to that which is essential.”
Gaven Kerr notes that Aquinas lists three modes of participation: to possess in a particular fashion; for a subject to
participate in its accidents; for an effect to participate in its cause (esp. if the effect is inferior to the power of the cause). The
first of the three concerns universality and particularity. See Gaven Kerr, “Aquinas: Metaphysics,” Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, accessed September 14, 2015, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-meta.
For other literature concerning participation in the philosophy and theology of Aquinas, see the following: Najeeb
Awad, “Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of ‘Relation’ and ‘Participation’ and Contemporary Trinitarian Theology,” New
Blackfriars 93:1048 (Nov. 2012): 652-670; W. Norris Clarke, “The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas,” Proceedings of
American Catholic Philosophical Association 26 (1952): 167-194; Cornelio Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione
secondo S. Tommaso,” 2nd ed. (Milan: Turin, 1950); L-B. Geiger, La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d’Aquin
(Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1953); Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (New
York: E.J. Brill, 1995).
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Wippel, “Metaphysics,” 93-94.
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ST I 13.5 ad 1. Cf. SCG I, 32 (6): “Everything that is predicated univocally of many things belongs through participation
to each of the things of which it is predicated; for the species is said to participate in the genus and the individual in the
species.”
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as has been noted several times above. Additionally, participation necessitates an impartial possession
of whatever perfection indeterminately pertains to the universal.306 Moreover, such a relationship of
participation further implies distinction between the universal and the subject in which it is instantiated.
John Wippel notes: “When anything is predicated of something by participation, something else must
be present there in addition to that which is participated.”307 This would require the persons of the
Trinity to be really distinct from the divine essence; i.e., the Father would not be identical with his own
divinity. Also, it would imply composition in God. Wippel, again: “Participation evidently entails
distinction and composition in the participant of a receiving and participating principle, and of that
which is received and participated.”308 Aquinas points out that this composition is one of potency and
act. “Everything that participates in something is compared to that which is participated as potency to
act: for through that which is participated the participant becomes actually such.”309 It almost goes
without saying that such real distinction and composition have no place in God.
For, if there were many gods, a necessary consequence would be the partition in each of
the essence of divinity, just as in two men the humanity differs in number from one to the
other; and the more so because the divine nature is not one thing and God Himself another.
From this it follows necessarily that, since there exists one divine nature in the Father and
the Son, the Father and the Son are one God.310
Participation in God, in the end, always amounts to a form of Arianism.311 On account of the division
of esse among particulars plus the imperfection, real distinction, and composition intrinsic to the
particular/universal relationship, it is clearly impossible for the divine essence to relate to the trinitarian
persons after the manner of a universal.312

SCG I, 32 (6): “Nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is determined to the mode of that
which is participated and is thus possessed in a partial way and not according to every mode of perfection.”
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Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 105. Cf. Quodlibet 2, q. 2, a. 1.
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Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 107. Cf. De pot. 7.3: “…in God there is no distinction between haver and the thing had,
or between participator and the thing participated: indeed he is both his own nature and his own being…”
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Dame, 1975).
310
SCG IV, 8 (1).
311
See SCG IV, 6 (1).
312
On the other hand, however, Aquinas does accept that there is a certain metaphorical way in which we can attribute
306

71

CHAPTER NINE: COMMUNICABILITY AND INCOMMUNICABILITY
In order to complete our investigation into the possibility of speaking of the divine essence as a
species predicated of several individuals, one additional pair of concepts needs to be examined, for it
contains the final distinctive element necessary for our analysis. The species is in relation to individuals
as a universal which communicates its perfection to particulars. The universal is defined as “that which
is common to many” or “can be in many or predicated of many.”313 The ability to be communicated to
many is called communicability. Its opposite, the impossibility of being communicated to many, is
called incommunicability. To communicate, broadly speaking, is “to have in common with another” or
“to share being with another.”314 The categories of universality and particularity as well as genus,
species, and individual are forms of communicability and incommunicability. Therefore, our inquiry
into the relation of persons to essence, in order to answer more fully whether it is after the manner of a
universal, must take into account these concepts of communicability and incommunicability.

What is Communicable and What is Incommunicable
Nature or form is communicable by virtue of itself. “Form of itself, unless something else
prevents it, can be received by many.”315 Form and nature as such can be common to many, but when
form is received in matter, however, “the form is determined to this one particular thing.”316 A species,
too, understood as universal form or nature, is communicable to many individuals. “Given the idea of a
species, it can be understood as existing in many.”317 The one universal nature, form, or species is

universality and particularity to God. This tolerance, not coincidentally, is often found in the context of a direct response to
one of the citations above from Damascene wherein he speaks of the divine essence as a species and the divine persons as
individuals. See ST I 40.3: “Now, although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality;
nevertheless, as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God; and thus Damascene says
that ‘substance is common and hypostasis is particular.’” In this way, then, Aquinas is comfortable saying that “the
hypostasis … is, as it were, a particular [quasi particulare].”
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ST I 3.2 ad 3. See also De Veritate q. 2, a. 5: “Now, every form is of itself universal…”; Quodlibet 7, 1, 3c; In Meta. 7,
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communicable to many supposits or individuals. Communication of a perfection to individuals amounts
to that perfection being predicated of each individual. Moreover, communicated along with nature is all
that pertains to that nature.318 This includes even that which distinguishes the things that communicate
in that nature319 and, thus, also the mode of existence of those things of that nature, i.e. to exist
individually. It does not, however, include the principle of that individuation.
Now just as a nature considered in itself is common, so also is that nature’s mode of
existence: for we do not find human nature existing in things except as individualized in
this or that man: since there is not a man that is not a particular man… But the principle
of that mode of existence, namely the principle of individuation, is not common, but
differs in each individual: for this particular thing is individualized by this matter, and that
one by that matter.320
The principle of individuation is individually unique to each hypostasis of the common nature. “That
whereby a common essence is individuated cannot pertain to many.”321 Among material creatures, that
principle of individuation is the distinct matter that uniquely individualizes the form.
According to Aquinas, “every form … is individualized” by “existing in [a] singular subject.” 322
He defines the hypostasis both as “that which subsists in a nature and is distinct from others” and also
as “an individual substance, one to wit that cannot be predicated of several,” and is thus
“incommunicable.”323 The communicability of the singular being is impossible in reality and even in
thought. “But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every
name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality
of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea.”324 As noted above, individuality

See Scriptum super Sententiis II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2; De Veritate q. 27, a. 3 ad 17.
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properly speaking cannot be defined, since no universal idea can be predicated of several individuals
precisely as they are individuals. It is clear, though, that individuality implies incommunicability,325
and that persons or hypostases are incommunicable. “The form signified by the word person … is that
which is the principle of incommunicability or individuation.”326 That which causes a thing to be
incommunicable—the principle of individuation—“cannot belong to several individuals,”327 since the
cause of incommunicability belongs properly to that individual thing.328 Whatever is proper to a
singular thing is unique and incommunicable to any other thing.329 “[A]n incommunicable person …
must be defined in reference to that which is proper.”330 For composite beings (material and angelic), to
each singular being its esse is always proper. “[T]he being [esse] of a thing is proper to that thing and
distinct from the being [esse] of anything else: whereas the essence may be common.”331 Since the
essence may be said to be common to its supposits, we could speak of the corresponding genus and
species signifying what is communicable to respective individuals. “[A]ll in one genus agree
[communicant] in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but
they differ in their existence [esse].”332 Understood according to the species/individual relationship, the
abstracted essence of each incommunicable individual is common by way of species.
Whereas the individual is incommunicable but can receive what is communicated by the
species, the species signifies what is communicable but does not receive what is communicated. Only
the supposit can properly be the subject of communication. “[N]o nature, essence or form can receive
See, esp., ST I 11.3: “For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is ‘this particular thing’ is because it cannot
be communicated to many…” Cf. ST III 77.2: “…it is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several; and
this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms,
subsisting of themselves, are also individuals of themselves. Secondly, because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is in
someone indeed, not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body.”
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the addition of something extraneous: although that which has a nature, form or essence can receive
something extraneous thereto, thus humanity contains nothing but what belongs intrinsically to
humanity.”333 The species is “numerically multiplied” to several things, since it is “predicated of many”
individuals.334 Species, nature, and form differ from person and individual precisely along the lines of
communicability and incommunicability.335 Stephen Hipp observes: “Not only is person individual, but
it differs from nature as such precisely according to the lack or presence of individuating
conditions.”336 These “individuating conditions” are the principles of individuation in each supposit (its
incommunicable subsistence).337 As we saw in the quote from Aquinas earlier, form is individuated in a
singular subject. Nature as such lacks incommunicability; the subsistent thing can receive what is
communicated but cannot communicate its own unique and proper existence.

The Incommunicability (and Communicability) of the Divine Nature
In very general terms, we can say that both incommunicability and communicability can be
predicated of God.338 The former attribute is rather straightforward in that there is and can be only one
divine substance. If God were communicable according to his nature or his being, there would be
several gods. And yet, God is communicable at the very least among the divine persons, since each
communicate in the divine essence. After treating how it is that God is incommunicable, I will turn to
address the trinitarian communicability in the Godhead. Aquinas asserts that the name “God” is not
univocally predicated of any being but of God alone, as it is “incommunicable according to the truth of

De pot. 7.4.
See Comp. I, 56: “That whereby a subsistent thing is this particular thing, distinct from other things, cannot be
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the thing,” that is, according to the divine nature which the name signifies.339 The divine nature is not
communicable to many; there is and can only be one God. “If an essence is individuated by itself, and
not by something else, it cannot pertain to many. But the divine essence is individuated by itself, since
God’s essence is not distinct from his existence… Hence God cannot be more than one only.”340 The
simplicity of the divine essence does not allow for any composition between supposit and nature in
God.341 Since the divine essence is identical with the divine esse, then clearly it is absolutely
impossible for the divine nature to be multiplied.342 “The fact that the being [esse] of God is selfsubsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows him to be distinguished from all
other beings…”343 No creature, then, can “attain to the divine essence and nature.”344 Instead, “the
divine nature is only communicable [to the creature] according to the participation of some
similitude.”345 Aquinas notes that the divine nature is a form that cannot be received in matter since it is
self-subsisting, and that it is “individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject.”346
Self-subsistence precludes predication of many, according to a multitude of substances.347
While Aquinas repeatedly rejects the communicability of the divine nature to a creature, he just
as often speaks of the divine nature being communicated from the Father to the Son and from both to
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communicated to the creature.”
345
ST I 13.9 ad 1.
346
ST I 3.2 ad 3. See also ST I 13.11 ad 1: “And still [the] more proper [name of God] is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to
signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular [singularem].”
347
See De pot. 9.3 ad 5: “…from the very fact that a thing is self-subsistent, it cannot be predicated of several.” Predication
of many, of course, is not precluded from God as self-subsistent according to many supposits, of course. That would mean
that there is no Trinity of persons numerically united in the divine essence. Each divine supposit is the divine substance.
Thanks to my advisor, Stephen Hipp, for his assistance on this point.
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the Holy Spirit.348 “We may say that [the Father] is the principle of the whole Godhead, not as
generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.”349 Now, Aquinas notes
that “that in the divine nature alone nature be communicated in several ways is reasonable,”350 that is,
by generative understanding as Word (or Son) and by spirative will as Love (or Spirit), since
“whatsoever is in God is subsistent, wherefore in God the divine nature is communicated in every
mode of procession.”351 In fact, it is the divine esse which is communicated: “The Son receives from
the Father identically the same being [idem numero esse] and identically the same nature [eamdem
naturam numero] as that of the Father.”352 Each supposit of the Trinity is identical in essence and esse,
and as such are one God.353 Thus, “the deity is common to several [pluribus deitas est communis].”354
Since the deity is common, we cannot speak of God in terms of singularity, lest we fall into the error of

In the context of explaining the nature of the communication of the divine nature from the Father to the Son, Aquinas
uses the language of specific likeness. This language is explained especially at ST I 4.3, where he calls the communication
in the same form a “likeness” or similitudo. See also De pot. 8.3 ad 15: “Likeness [similitudo] is sameness of quality in
things that differ…” At ST I 4.3 again: if the likeness is between two things that “communicate in the same form” and
“according to the same formality,” they share a specific likeness. Specific likeness is communication in a form according to
the same formality of the species. If communication is not according to the same formality, the two are “not contained in the
same species.” It is a likeness, but it is only generic. A specific likeness, though, arises among things communicating in the
same form, according to the same formality, that is, according to what makes the form specifically that form. Now, a
common form can be communicated either equally or unequally. Cf. ST I 42.1 ad 1: “For whatever things have a common
form may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally…” Equal communication is according to
the same mode in each individual, while unequal communication is “according to more or less.” See ST I 4.3. Aquinas
makes these distinctions primarily to show that the Son shares a specific likeness with the Father, for they equally possess
the common form of divinity. Cf. De pot. 9.5 ad 18: “The begetter begets his like in species…”
349
ST I 39.5 ad 6. See also De Veritate 27.3 ad 17: “For it is essential to the sonship that the son have the nature of his
begetter. Hence, if God the Father did not communicate to His Son the fullness of His nature, that would seem to be due
either to impotency or to jealousy…”; SCG IV, 7 (24): “…the Son has received the divine nature from the Father.”; ST I
42.5: “The Father is in the Son by his essence, forasmuch as the Father is his own essence and communicates his essence to
the Son not by any change on his part.”; ST I 42.6 ad 2: “…the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as he
communicates his essence.”; De pot. 9.9 ad 17: “Just as the communication of the divine nature by the Father to the Son
belongs to their perfection, so the perfect reception of the communicated nature belongs to the perfection of the Holy
Ghost…”; ST I 30.2 ad 4: “So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as
principle of its communication to another.”
350
SCG IV, 23 (13).
351
De pot. 9.9 ad sed contra no. 1.
352
De pot. 10.1 ad 14. See also SCG IV, 5 (5): “…he who begets gives being [esse] to the begotten…”
353
Cf. SCG I, 42 (12): But if [the name God] is used univocally [of two things], it must be predicated of both according to
one notion, which means that, in notion, there must be in both one nature [una natura secundum rationem]. Either,
therefore, this nature is in both according to one being [secundum unum esse], or according to a being that is other in each
case [aut secundum aliud et aliud]. If according to one, there will not be two gods, but only one, since there cannot be one
being [unum esse] for two things that are substantially distinguished. If each has its own being [aliud et aliud esse in
utroque], therefore in neither being will the quiddity be its being [esse]. Yet this must be posited in God. Therefore, neither
of these two beings is what we understand by the name God. It is, therefore, impossible to posit two gods.”
354
ST I 31.2.
348
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Sabellius who rejected the plurality of persons.355 Instead, the deity is truly communicated to three
persons. Yet, the divine essence cannot be communicated beyond the three persons of the Trinity, for it
is only communicated via relations of origin which must be only three.356

The Incommunicability of the Divine Persons
Even regarding the inner trinitarian life of God, a further distinction is necessary as to what in
God is communicable and what is not. Aquinas notes that while “all that is absolute is common and
undivided,” “the only thing that is distinct and incommunicable in the divine nature is relation,”
meaning that what is peculiar to each person cannot be common.357 “The Father and the Son, unity of
essence considered, do not differ save in this: He is the Father and He is the Son. So, anything other
than this is common to the Father and the Son.”358 The persons are utterly united in the unity of the
common divine nature. “The essence of each … is one essence.”359 The divinity is communicable to
three hypostases. However, the hypostases, despite their identity of essence and esse, are
incommunicable. Thus, God is both communicable and incommunicable in that he is the Trinity.
Aquinas notes that “nothing prevents contradictory statements being verified about one same thing
from different points of view… Wherefore since essence and property are the same in reality but differ
logically, nothing prevents the one being common and the other incommunicable.”360 The divine
essence is common to three incommunicable persons.
Aquinas observes that the word “person” was introduced to describe each distinct supposit of
God precisely because it refers to a subsistent, incommunicable thing of a nature. “The word person
signifies one that subsists in the divine nature distinctly and incommunicably.”361 That distinct and
ST I 31.2. See also De pot. 9.8.
See SCG IV, 26 (5).
357
De pot. 9.4.
358
SCG IV, 24 (14). What is common to the Father and the Son even includes being the principle of the Holy Spirit. See ST
I 40.1 ad 1.
359
SCG IV, 9 (7).
360
De pot. 7.1 ad 5.
361
De pot. 9.6 ad 4.
355
356
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incommunicable mode of existence proper to a person, moreover, in God corresponds to the relations
in the Godhead. “Distinction and incommunicability … are due to the relative properties in God.”362
These “relative properties” constitute the persons insofar as whatever is proper to each thing is what
makes it incommunicable.363 “The Father is not constituted an incommunicable person otherwise than
by Paternity which belongs to him as begetting.”364 Aquinas elaborates on the identity of property and
essence in God, as well as the distinction between them: “And just as Paternity, although it is the divine
essence, is not common as the essence is: even so although the Father is the very same thing as God, he
is not common as God is, but proper. Accordingly God the Father as God is something common as
having the divine nature, and as Father is something proper and distinct from the other persons.”365
Each property must be proper and not common,366 lest distinction in God be in regard to something
absolute, which is contrary to the divine unity.367 Since distinction is on account of relative personal
properties, however, there is no contradiction between the divine unity and the multiplicity of divine
supposits.
Finally, Aquinas notes that while the divine essence is common to three hypostases, there is also
a commonality in the persons in as much as each is a person, thus sharing what it means to be a person,
i.e. to be a distinct subsistence.368 “The Father is someone and is the Father on account of the relation:
but he is someone on account of the relation considered in general [relation as common]: while that he

De pot. 9.6 ad 3.
See Comp. I, 60: “For a divine person is constituted by the properties, not in the sense that He is constituted by several of
them, but in the sense that the relative, subsisting property itself is a person. … Accordingly, the notions constituting
persons are three in number: paternity, filiation, and procession. And these notions must be strict properties. For that which
constitutes a person must pertain to that person alone; individuating principles cannot belong to several individuals.”
364
De pot. 9.9 ad 2.
365
De pot. 8.3.
366
Cf. De pot. 9.9 ad 18: “As we have already observed, that which makes a person incommunicable cannot be common to
many. Hence the result of sharing therein would be not enjoyment but the destruction of the distinction of persons.”
367
See De pot. 9.9 ad 1: “Hence if in God filiation were common to several (Persons) it would not make the personality of
the Son incommunicable, and thus the Son would have to be made an individual Person by something absolute, and this is
incompatible with the unity of the divine essence.”
368
Cf. ST I 30.4 ad 2: “Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be
common to many.”
362
363
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is a particular someone is due to this particular relation [as proper] which is Paternity.”369 The relations
considered in general are common “in idea”: “Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that
each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name ‘person’ is
common in idea to the three divine persons.”370 On this point, Aquinas says that “person” is not really
common to each, but is only common logically. “Now it is clear that this [i.e., that this term ‘person’ is
common to the three] is not community of a real thing, as if one essence were common to the three;
otherwise there would be only one person of the three, as also one essence.”371 The essence is really
common to each person, while the mode of incommunicability is only common logically.

Logically Common Versus Really Common
What is communicated becomes common to the many things it is predicated of either logically
(that is, according to the abstraction of the mind) or really (according to the reality of the things). “Now
that which is common logically and not really is common after the manner of a universal.”372
Universality—the relationship of a species to its corresponding individuals—is logically common to its
particulars, but in reality is only abstracted from what is really present diversely in the latter. Aquinas
directly responds to the analogy of Damascene precisely along the lines of this distinction between the
logically common and really common.
Damascene uses the word species metaphorically and not in the strict sense. God’s name
(i.e. God) is like a species in that it is predicated essentially of several distinct individuals:
but it cannot be called a species strictly speaking, since a species is not identically the
same in each individual but only logically: whereas the same identical divine essence is
common to the three Persons: wherefore Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one God, but
Peter, Paul and Mark are not one man.373

De pot. 8.4 ad 2.
ST I 30.4.
371
ST I 30.4.
372
De pot. 9.4, obj. 5.
373
De pot. 7.3 ad 1.
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Logical identity and logical commonality belong to the relation of species and individual. The persons
of the Trinity, however, are not only logically one in essence, but share the divine essence as really
common and absolutely one. “The unity or community of the human nature is not a reality [non est
secundum rem], but is only in the consideration of the mind. …whereas the form signified by the name
‘God’—that is, the divine essence—is really one and common [una et communis secundum rem].”374
Because the divine nature is one according to esse, Aquinas calls this really common essence the same
numerical nature. “…God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter.”375 There can only
be one divine nature, and yet there are several supposits of that nature; therefore, the nature is
numerically identical in each supposit. “For, if in the Son there is the divine nature, and if the divine
nature cannot be multiplied … it follows necessarily that there is numerical identity of nature and
essence in the Father and the Son.”376 The essential unity between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is not
simply a logical community of species (like human nature), but, moreover, is a community of identity,
as there is only one and same essence among them.377 Therefore, there cannot be a divine species
communicated to several divine individuals. There is no universal in God.378

ST I 39.4 ad 3. See also SCG IV, 14 (14): “…although God is substantially predicated of the Father and the Son, it does
not for all that follow that, if the Father and the Son are a kind of plurality, they are a plurality of gods. For they are many by
reason of the distinction of subsistent relations, yet one God, nevertheless, by reason of the unity of subsistent essence. This
does not happen among men, of course—that is, that some plurality is one man—since the essence of humanity is not
numerically one in each of the plurality, nor is the essence of humanity subsistent; that is, humanity is not a man.”
375
ST I 39.5 ad 2.
376
SCG IV, 7 (20).
377
See ST I 41.5 ad 1: “Since the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to
Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity [idem numero], and not only of species, as in things created.”
Cf. SCG IV, 11 (12): “But the nature of God is not in the Word of God thus: it is one in species and differs in
number. … The Word, therefore, has the divine essence itself; has it with an identity not only of species but of number. A
nature, again, which is one in species, is not divided into a numerical many except by reason of matter. But the divine nature
is entirely immaterial. It is, therefore, impossible that the divine nature be specifically one and numerically different. The
Word of God, therefore, has a nature in common with God and his it with numerical identity. For this reason the Word of
God and the God whose Word He is are not two gods, but one God. For the fact that among us two who have human nature
are two men hinges on the fact that human nature is numerically divided in those two. But … things which are divided in
creatures are in God simply one being; thus, in creatures the essence is one thing and the act of being another; and in some
creatures even what subsists in the essence is one thing, and its essence or nature another; for this man is neither his
humanity nor his act of being. But God is both His essence and His act of being.”
378
See De veritate 2.6: “…for every form as such is universal, unless it happens to be a subsistent form.”
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Since a species is only logically common to its subordinate individuals (and not common
according to reality), it cannot be applied to the divine essence. However, since Aquinas grants that
personhood is logically common to the three divine supposits, it raises an interesting and unexpected
question whether “person” is common to them after the manner of a universal. Aquinas himself seems
to speak exactly in these terms:
Although in God nothing is really common save the one essence, there is a logical
community in the divine persons in the fact that each is a supposit of the essence. This
community is indicated in all concrete essential names that signify the supposit in
general… Accordingly it is logically common to the three Persons to be a supposit of the
divine nature, although the three persons are not one supposit, but three: even as Socrates
and Plato are two men although it is logically common to them to be a man.379
It is logically common according to the manner of a species that two men share what it means to be a
man, that is, that they have human nature. Even as distinct and incommunicable individuals, then,
multiple beings can share something in common, such as the universal nature, but seemingly even the
notion of what it means to be a person. Replying to this claim that since “person” is logically common
in God and thus like a universal,380 Aquinas responds: “In God there are no differences of being [esse]
since there is but one being in him [ibi sit tantum unum esse]. Now this is incompatible with the idea of
universal, wherefore there is no universal in him, although there is in him one thing logically and not
really [licet sit ibi unum secundum rationem, et non secundum rem].”381 Therefore, just because
personhood is logically common to each divine person, those persons are not a community of a
universality. He explains that this is true even in regard to created persons.
We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name ‘person’ is common by a
community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague individual thing [individuum
vagum]. … The vague individual thing, as ‘some man’ signifies the common nature with
the determinate mode of existence of singular things—that is, something self-subsisting,
as distinct from others.382
De pot. 8.3 ad 11. Cf. also 9.6: “Since then there are several properties which cause a distinct and incommunicable being
in God [proprietates facientes esse distinctum et incommunicabile in divinis sint plures], it follows that person is predicated
of God in the plural, even as it is predicated of man on account of the manifold individualizing principles.”
380
See De pot. 9.4, obj. 5.
381
De pot. 9.4 ad 5.
382
ST I 30.4.
379
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Therefore, the divine persons are not individuals of the species “person,” although “person” is logically
common to each, since each have the property of incommunicability. The individual, properly
speaking, cannot be defined; neither, then, is individuality or personhood composed of genus and
specific difference. Instead, persons are logically common inasmuch as we know all incommunicable
supposits to be individuated in a vague sense.
*****
The species/individual relationship, like the relation of the divine essence to the divine
hypostases, is one of the communicable and the incommunicable. “In God, of course, there are neither
matter and form, nor universal and particular. Nevertheless there is in the Godhead something that is
common, and something that is proper and that supposes the common nature. In our human way of
thinking, the divine persons are to the divine essence what individual supposita are to a common
nature.”383 Aquinas grants that the similarity is strong according to our human mode of understanding,
for in the material, created things that we know, all commonality of the individual beings is by way of
species. Just as a species is communicable and the individuals thereof are incommunicable, so too the
divine essence is communicable to three incommunicable supposits. Communicability is not, however,
identical to universality.384 While the divine essence is communicable, it is not a universal or a species,
since the latter two are constituted by individual things that are diverse in esse and not numerically
one.385 A species is a logical commonality among actually diverse beings. The divinity, on the other
hand, is really common to three persons and numerically identical among them.

Comp. I, 62.
Thanks to my advisor, Stephen Hipp, for the language on this point.
385
Cf. ST I 30.4: “But there is this difference—that the term ‘some man’ signifies the nature, or the individual on the part of
its nature, with the mode of existence of singular things; while this name ‘person’ is not given to signify the individual on
the part of the nature [for that would be signified by ‘some god’], but the subsistent reality in that nature.” Here, Aquinas
offers some clarification regarding the use of the term person pertinent to our discussion. He shows that person does not
necessitate a relationship of an individual to a nature with the individual having a mode of existence whereby it is distinct in
esse from other persons, but instead merely refers to that subsistent thing in any given nature, whatever its mode of
existence. In this way, a person of the Trinity is not an individual of a species nor a particular of a universal but instead is
simply a subsistent reality in the divine nature.
383
384
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION
This paper has set out to provide the Thomistic reasoning behind the applicability (or lack
thereof) of the species/individual relationship to the relationship of the divine essence and three persons
of the Trinity. The question originated in part, of course, as a matter of indirect disagreement between
Augustine and Damascene, the first arguing at some length against the analogy, while the latter
affirming it in passing at numerous instances. Peter Lombard is the first to attempt a conclusive
resolution to the disagreement, siding with Augustine, while allowing for a metaphorical (that is,
according to similitude) reading of Damascene’s assertions. The philosophical rigor of Aquinas’s
trinitarian theology uniquely positions him to provide not only a second opinion on the matter, but
more importantly a thorough analysis and subsequent ratio underpinning both the rejection of the
species/individual analogy, but also a nuanced acceptance of Damascene’s position.
The rejection of the analogy of species and individual for Aquinas consistently rests on the
identity of essence and existence in God. “God is not only His own essence, but also His own existence
[esse].”386 Because everything in the Godhead is identical in esse—even the three supposits—there can
only be one divine esse, just as there is only one divine essence, and only one divine ens. God is
absolutely one in essence and esse, but relatively distinct in three supposital units. “[T]he divine
persons have one being [esse]; whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of
many which differ in being [esse].”387 Although the divine essence is communicable to three
incommunicable divine supposits, it is not communicable after the manner of a universal, which
presupposes a nature logically common, but not really common or numerically identical. Since the
logical participations of universals and particulars (and thus genus and species) are founded upon
several distinct beings which all differ in esse, God cannot be spoken of as a universal.

ST I 3.4. The foundation for Aquinas’s reasoning is derivative from, or at least in concert with, Augustine’s emphasis on
the identity of essence, being, and supposit in God. See De Trinitate VII, 4 (9): “For so, because it is the same thing for Him
to be God as it is to be, it is just as wrong to say three essences as it is to say three gods.”
387
ST I 30.4 ad 3.
386
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Moreover, I showed above how the divine unity is not contrary to but beyond that of a specific
unity that is founded upon its indetermination to its subordinate individuals. Neither is God material or
even composite; therefore, “species” can only improperly be applied to him. The divine persons are not
strictly speaking individuals, but only insofar as “individuality” connotes subsistence. Further, God
transcends every genus as Creator of every genus of beings. The unity of the species is accidental and
the plurality of its subordinate individuals is absolute; the inverse is the case in God: his unity is
absolute, while his plurality—though not accidental—is only on account of the opposition of relation
and so we predicate of the Trinity a transcendental multitude. Since there is really one divine essence
secundum rem, we can say that the essence of God is really and numerically common to three
supposits, as opposed to the logically common essence found in the unity of a species. The numerical
identity of the common essence of the three divine persons is manifest even in their common esse. The
three divine supposits share the singular divine esse just as they share the singular divine essence, since
essence and existence are identical in the divine. The absolute simplicity of God, then, precludes
predicating any universality of him—especially that of a genus or species—on all these accounts.
Aquinas, then, consistently follows “the Master” Lombard in siding with Augustine. He also
adopts the position that Damascene can be read in continuity with the Augustinian position if we
understand Damascene’s way of speaking to be metaphorical. “Although strictly speaking genus and
species, universal and particular, are not predicated of God, nevertheless as far as it is possible to
compare God to creatures, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are distinguished from one another like
several individuals of one species, as Damascene says.”388 The strict mode of predication pertinent to
the species/individual relationship precludes positing it of God, due to its problematic implications.
According to the limited mode of our human understanding, however, the relationship of individuals to
a species maintains a unique similitude for the human mind to catch a glimpse of that profoundly

388

De pot. 10.2 ad 12.
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inaccessible mode of essential unity found only in the God whose essence, esse, and supposit are
identical. Since the category of universality introduces us to what it means to be communicable, it can
be a first stepping stone to knowing that mode of existence that is beyond universality where, except
for relation, all in God is really common and absolutely one.
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